Imagine that, in a General Election, each of the three main UK parties gets exactly one third of the vote. As a result it is agreed that the three party leaders (Theresa May, Jeremy Corbyn and Tim Farron) will share the role of Prime Minister. Not only that, but, by some miracle, it turns out that all three of them agree 100% on every single issue imaginable so that every action or decision of one of the three is fully concurred with by the other two. Furthermore, due to the wonders of modern technology they are constantly linked to each other by an online connection which means that any conversation one of them takes part in is instantaneously seen and heard - and, naturally, concurred with - by the other two.
In the situation described above, would it be legitimate to say that although each of the three party leaders is Prime Minister, there is actually only one Prime Minister because each of the three share exactly the same power and knowledge and - because of their absolute agreement on all possible issues - there is no possibility of conflict, rivalry or disagreement between them?
I think that this type of model is one way to make some kind of sense out of the doctrine of the Trinity. Each of the Divine Persons shares the one office of God (ie. the office of supreme ruler of the universe). Since each of the Persons fully possesses all the divine powers and attributes (ie. each is fully omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient, omnibenevolent etc.) and since, because of the infinite nature of the divine attributes, each individual Person has these attributes to the exact same degree as do the three of them combined, and since there is no possibility of disagreement or rivalry between them, perhaps it is legitimate to symbolise this situation by referring to each of the Persons as God while simultaneously asserting that there is only one God.
A similar model is to think of God as a Composite Being comprised of three inseparable Divine Persons and to assert that each of the Persons is fully God even though none of them is all of God. Again, this is to symbolise the fact that each each of the Persons fully possesses all the divine powers and attributes (ie. each is fully omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient, omnibenevolent etc.) and that, because of the infinite nature of the divine attributes, each individual Person has these attributes to the exact same degree as do the three of them combined, and also that there is no possibility of disagreement or rivalry between the Persons.
Personally, I incline more towards the first of these models because of my (biblically based) belief that the Father is "the only true God" while the Son and Spirit share fully in His divine power and attributes.
Of course, neither of these models can explain how God could literally be both one Being and three Persons simultaneously. For example, using the first model, imagine one of the Prime Ministerial Persons has an egg thown at him/her. In that case, it would be possible to say that the Prime Minister both did and did not get splatted with egg yolk (depending on which of the Persons one is considering). Yet it is logically impossible for the same thing to be both 'X' and 'not X' simultaneously.
Saturday 10 September 2016
Friday 9 September 2016
Group names and collective entities
Most of the top premier league football clubs have massive squads of players as well as many non-playing staff. But when 11 members of, say, Manchester United, travel to another team's ground for an away match, we say that Manchester United (not 'some of Manchester United' or 'part of Manchester United') have come to play.
Similarly, imagine a pop group (let's invent one - we'll call them 'The Bloggers') has five members. If one of the members gets sick and the remaining four do a gig, we still say that the Bloggers (not some of the Bloggers or part of the Bloggers) are performing.
If Mr and Mrs Smith and two of their four children turn up at my house I will probably inform my wife that "the Smith family have arrived", rather than denoting them as 'some of the Smith family' or 'part of the Smith family'.
In these cases, a part of the collective entity (team/group/family)possesses all the essence of the whole and (in the case of the football team or pop group) is authorised by the whole to use the official name of the whole.
How far these examples are useful to understanding the Doctrine of the Trinity (by demonstrating that a part of an entity can be legitimately designated by the same term used to denote the entity in its entirety) is debatable, however. I'm not sure we would ever call one footballer by the name of his team or one pop group member by the name of the group. And if Mr Smith popped over for lunch I wouldn't describe my guest as 'the Smith family'. It seems that what these examples consist of is group names, and that such names can be equally applied to the whole of the group or to a part of the group but never to a 'non-group', ie. they cannot be applied to an individual (such as a Person).
Similarly, imagine a pop group (let's invent one - we'll call them 'The Bloggers') has five members. If one of the members gets sick and the remaining four do a gig, we still say that the Bloggers (not some of the Bloggers or part of the Bloggers) are performing.
If Mr and Mrs Smith and two of their four children turn up at my house I will probably inform my wife that "the Smith family have arrived", rather than denoting them as 'some of the Smith family' or 'part of the Smith family'.
In these cases, a part of the collective entity (team/group/family)possesses all the essence of the whole and (in the case of the football team or pop group) is authorised by the whole to use the official name of the whole.
How far these examples are useful to understanding the Doctrine of the Trinity (by demonstrating that a part of an entity can be legitimately designated by the same term used to denote the entity in its entirety) is debatable, however. I'm not sure we would ever call one footballer by the name of his team or one pop group member by the name of the group. And if Mr Smith popped over for lunch I wouldn't describe my guest as 'the Smith family'. It seems that what these examples consist of is group names, and that such names can be equally applied to the whole of the group or to a part of the group but never to a 'non-group', ie. they cannot be applied to an individual (such as a Person).
Wednesday 24 August 2016
Is God a set of attributes?
If we were to conveive of the word 'God' as referring to a set of conditions, qualities or attributes, there would cease to be a problem with understanding the doctrine of the trinity. I have thought of several analogies that could work on this basis. For example, there can be many instances of the English alphabet (in a school textbook, a poster on a classroom wall, a children's song etc). Each of them is a true instance of the English alphabet yet there is only one English alphabet.
There could be several versions of the National Anthem, yet there would still be only one National Anthem.
The play I am watching at the theatre in London is 'Hamlet'. The play you are watching in New York is also 'Hamlet'. Yet there is only one play called 'Hamlet'.
What these things have in common is that they are sets of symbols, sounds or words that can be arranged or reproduced in various ways so that each arrangement is a distinct version of the one set.
On this basis, one could resolve the problem of the apparent incoherence of the doctrine of the Trinity by conceiving of God as a set of divine qualities (say, omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence and omnibenevolence) and then positing each of the three Persons as a distinct, personalised instance (or personification) of that set of qualities, each one comprising a different 'arrangement' of the entire set.
I do not believe, however, that this would be a viable approach, since Christians have always conveived of the one God as a concrete Being, not an abstract set of qualities or attributes. A set of qualities cannot be personal (or 'superpersonal') even if 'personality' or 'personalness' is one of the qualities in the set. I know of no instance in the English language where a set of qualities or attributes could be described as 'him' or 'her', no matter how many people it is personified by.
There could be several versions of the National Anthem, yet there would still be only one National Anthem.
The play I am watching at the theatre in London is 'Hamlet'. The play you are watching in New York is also 'Hamlet'. Yet there is only one play called 'Hamlet'.
What these things have in common is that they are sets of symbols, sounds or words that can be arranged or reproduced in various ways so that each arrangement is a distinct version of the one set.
On this basis, one could resolve the problem of the apparent incoherence of the doctrine of the Trinity by conceiving of God as a set of divine qualities (say, omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence and omnibenevolence) and then positing each of the three Persons as a distinct, personalised instance (or personification) of that set of qualities, each one comprising a different 'arrangement' of the entire set.
I do not believe, however, that this would be a viable approach, since Christians have always conveived of the one God as a concrete Being, not an abstract set of qualities or attributes. A set of qualities cannot be personal (or 'superpersonal') even if 'personality' or 'personalness' is one of the qualities in the set. I know of no instance in the English language where a set of qualities or attributes could be described as 'him' or 'her', no matter how many people it is personified by.
Tuesday 23 August 2016
Embracing paradox
Recently, I was reading about the existentialist philospher Kierkegaard's view that ultimate truth is impossible for human beings to grasp because we do not have the necessary conceptual framework. This is not the same as when people say that 'God is beyond logic'. Rather, it is to say that the truth about God is perfectly logical within the context of the infinite and eternal realm that God inhabits but that, being finite creatures bound by space and time, what we are able to grasp of the truth about God appears to us to be paradoxical.
Imagine living in a two dimensional world like that described by C.S. Lewis in the passage from Mere Christianity that I quoted in my second post on this blog. Now imagine looking at two squares, the first measuring 2" x 2", the second measuring 6" x 6". The idea that the first of these shapes could be larger than the second would seem totally illogical and against all the rules of mathematics. This is because, as someone only capable of thinking in two dimensions, I am aware of the size in terms of area, but not in terms of volume, which would be totally beyond my experience or even ability to conceptualise. In actual fact it is perfectly possible for the first shape to be larger than the second if, for example, as well as its length and width of 2" x 2", it had a height of, say, 10" while the second shape had a height of only 1". In that case, the volume of the first shape (which is in actuality a cube rather than a square) would be 40" (2" x 2" x 10") while that of the second shape would be only 36" (6" x 6" x 1").
Ultimately, however, I do not think Kierkegaard's idea that eternal truth appears to finite minds as paradox can be used as a way of justifying belief in the doctrine of the Trinity. It doesn't make any difference how much we fail to understand about the nature of the Father or of the Son (or simply of the Being called God) or how impossible it is to grasp who or what they are in themselves as opposed to how they appear to our limited finite minds. The relevant issue is the idea that neither the Father nor the Son is the other, yet each of them is the same Being, namely God. The assertion that a=/=b yet a=x and b=x is just as illogical, no matter what a,b and x represent. Of course, if the word 'is' had some special meaning in the infinite or eternal dimension which was incapable of being grasped by our finite minds then it would be possible to say that the doctrine of the Trinity is true in some sense that it is beyond our capacity as finite beings to grasp. But the word 'is' was invented by us finite, time/space-bound creatures to serve a particular linguistic role, to convey the idea of identity as understood by us finite, time/space-bound creatures. It's meaning is defined by us and us alone. Defenders of the doctrine of the Trinity cannot, therefore, appeal to the infinite, eternal realm as an escape route from the incoherence and internally contradictory nature of that doctrine.
Imagine living in a two dimensional world like that described by C.S. Lewis in the passage from Mere Christianity that I quoted in my second post on this blog. Now imagine looking at two squares, the first measuring 2" x 2", the second measuring 6" x 6". The idea that the first of these shapes could be larger than the second would seem totally illogical and against all the rules of mathematics. This is because, as someone only capable of thinking in two dimensions, I am aware of the size in terms of area, but not in terms of volume, which would be totally beyond my experience or even ability to conceptualise. In actual fact it is perfectly possible for the first shape to be larger than the second if, for example, as well as its length and width of 2" x 2", it had a height of, say, 10" while the second shape had a height of only 1". In that case, the volume of the first shape (which is in actuality a cube rather than a square) would be 40" (2" x 2" x 10") while that of the second shape would be only 36" (6" x 6" x 1").
Ultimately, however, I do not think Kierkegaard's idea that eternal truth appears to finite minds as paradox can be used as a way of justifying belief in the doctrine of the Trinity. It doesn't make any difference how much we fail to understand about the nature of the Father or of the Son (or simply of the Being called God) or how impossible it is to grasp who or what they are in themselves as opposed to how they appear to our limited finite minds. The relevant issue is the idea that neither the Father nor the Son is the other, yet each of them is the same Being, namely God. The assertion that a=/=b yet a=x and b=x is just as illogical, no matter what a,b and x represent. Of course, if the word 'is' had some special meaning in the infinite or eternal dimension which was incapable of being grasped by our finite minds then it would be possible to say that the doctrine of the Trinity is true in some sense that it is beyond our capacity as finite beings to grasp. But the word 'is' was invented by us finite, time/space-bound creatures to serve a particular linguistic role, to convey the idea of identity as understood by us finite, time/space-bound creatures. It's meaning is defined by us and us alone. Defenders of the doctrine of the Trinity cannot, therefore, appeal to the infinite, eternal realm as an escape route from the incoherence and internally contradictory nature of that doctrine.
Wednesday 4 May 2016
As you were... again!
My idea of describing the persons of the Trinity as God-Persons doesn't really resolve the problem of the Trinity at all. Maybe it sidesteps the difficulties involved but it certainly doesn't make it possible for me to call myself an orthodox Trinitarian. The reason is that a God-Person is not God. A God-Person is not something that there is only one of, because clearly there are three God-Persons. Therefore, as there is only one God, a God-Person cannot be God (or rather, not all three of them can). So what is a God-Person, if not God? There are two possibilities; a God-Person is either a god (one of two or perhaps three) or someone who, while not actually being God, is divine. Neither of these possibilities would be acceptable to an orthodox Trinitarian as they believe that the Son and the Spirit are not merely divine and that neither are they a plurality of gods, but that each of them, along with the Father, is the one true God.
So, it seems there is really no change in my position at all. I'm still someone who believes that the one God is the Father and that the doctrine of the Trinity is not literally true. My view of the DOT is still a 'liberal' one (or, as I sometimes prefer to say, a radical Protestant one) and I'm okay with that!
So, it seems there is really no change in my position at all. I'm still someone who believes that the one God is the Father and that the doctrine of the Trinity is not literally true. My view of the DOT is still a 'liberal' one (or, as I sometimes prefer to say, a radical Protestant one) and I'm okay with that!
Thursday 28 April 2016
One God-Being, three God-Persons (part 2)
In my previous post, I suggested that "the God-Person known as the Father sometimes speaks on behalf of, and represents, the group (or family) known as the God-Being." However, on reflection I think this is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, it means that each of the God-Persons constitutes only one third of the God-Being which raises the question of whether or not any of them possesses the fullness of the divine nature. Secondly, The import of biblical passages which reference the Father as the one, or the only, true God seems weakened by the notion that they really mean that He merely represents the one true God.
Since I believe (and stated in my previous post) that the Father is the source of the divine nature of the Son and Holy Spirit, it seems appropriate to say that the Father Himself is the God-Being (as well as being one of the God-Persons) while the other two God-Persons, since they derive their divine nature from the Father, can be said to participate in His Being.
To use a rather outlandish example, imagine that the entire human race has been wiped out in some freak nuclear accident apart from one survivor - a genius scientist named Tom. Tom has two best friends called Dick and Harry and although he couldn't completely save them, being a scientific genius he did manage to preserve each of their brains which he now keeps in two jars of formaldehyde. Again, being a scientific genius, Tom has managed to wire each of his two friends' brains up to his own body so that each of them is now able to see through Tom's eyes, to speak through his mouth and even to walk around, pick things up etc, using Tom's feet, hands and limbs. Fortunately, Tom Dick and Harry have similar tastes in terms of where they want to go and what they want to do, so there are no conflicts over how to make use of Tom's body. In this bizarre scenario, I think it would be appropriate to say that there are three human persons - Tom, Dick and Harry - but only one human being, namely Tom, although the other two persons participate in Tom's being through having access to his human physical attributes. In other words they derive the non-personal aspects of their human nature from Tom. Likewise, in the case of the Holy Trinity we can say that there are three God-Persons and one God-Being, the Father, from whom the other two God-Persons derive their divine nature and attributes.
The scripture passages which speak of the Father as the one true God do so because he is the only true God-Being. However, all three God-Persons, in equal measure, possess and partake of the nature and attributes of that Being just as, in my analogy, the three human persons, Tom, Dick and Harry, share in the one human nature which is derived from the one surviving human being, Tom.
Since I believe (and stated in my previous post) that the Father is the source of the divine nature of the Son and Holy Spirit, it seems appropriate to say that the Father Himself is the God-Being (as well as being one of the God-Persons) while the other two God-Persons, since they derive their divine nature from the Father, can be said to participate in His Being.
To use a rather outlandish example, imagine that the entire human race has been wiped out in some freak nuclear accident apart from one survivor - a genius scientist named Tom. Tom has two best friends called Dick and Harry and although he couldn't completely save them, being a scientific genius he did manage to preserve each of their brains which he now keeps in two jars of formaldehyde. Again, being a scientific genius, Tom has managed to wire each of his two friends' brains up to his own body so that each of them is now able to see through Tom's eyes, to speak through his mouth and even to walk around, pick things up etc, using Tom's feet, hands and limbs. Fortunately, Tom Dick and Harry have similar tastes in terms of where they want to go and what they want to do, so there are no conflicts over how to make use of Tom's body. In this bizarre scenario, I think it would be appropriate to say that there are three human persons - Tom, Dick and Harry - but only one human being, namely Tom, although the other two persons participate in Tom's being through having access to his human physical attributes. In other words they derive the non-personal aspects of their human nature from Tom. Likewise, in the case of the Holy Trinity we can say that there are three God-Persons and one God-Being, the Father, from whom the other two God-Persons derive their divine nature and attributes.
The scripture passages which speak of the Father as the one true God do so because he is the only true God-Being. However, all three God-Persons, in equal measure, possess and partake of the nature and attributes of that Being just as, in my analogy, the three human persons, Tom, Dick and Harry, share in the one human nature which is derived from the one surviving human being, Tom.
Wednesday 27 April 2016
One God-Being, three God-Persons (part 1)
I have decided that in order to get around the problem of the Trinity, I am no longer going to speak of God in an unqualified way. From now on I will refer either to the one 'God-Being' or to the three 'God-Persons'. The one God-Being is a group, or family, consisting of the three God-Persons.
Surely, nobody could object to my decision to use this terminology, for all Christians, at least those with an orthodox view of the Trinity, believe that there is only one Being called God and that there are three Persons called God.
I also posit that the God-Person known as the Father sometimes speaks on behalf of, and represents, the group (or family) known as the God-Being. This is because the other two God-Persons derive their divine nature (their infinite power and knowledge and other divine attributes) from the Father. This accounts for passages in the Bible such as Isaiah 45:5 ("I am the LORD and there is no other; apart from me there is no God") or John 17:3 where Jesus says to the Father that eternal life is to "know you, the only true God..." In the former statement, I believe, the Father is acting as a Spokesperson, or mouthpiece, for the God-Being as a whole while in the latter, Jesus is addressing the Father in his capacity as representative of the whole God-Being. A similar situation obtains with regard to 1 Corinthians 8:6, where Paul writes that "for us there is but one God, the Father".
By adopting this terminology of one God-Being and three God-Persons, I believe I will be able to be true to the spirit of the Trinitarian concept of God while using language that does not degenerate into incoherence.
(Bible quotes from the New International Version.)
Surely, nobody could object to my decision to use this terminology, for all Christians, at least those with an orthodox view of the Trinity, believe that there is only one Being called God and that there are three Persons called God.
I also posit that the God-Person known as the Father sometimes speaks on behalf of, and represents, the group (or family) known as the God-Being. This is because the other two God-Persons derive their divine nature (their infinite power and knowledge and other divine attributes) from the Father. This accounts for passages in the Bible such as Isaiah 45:5 ("I am the LORD and there is no other; apart from me there is no God") or John 17:3 where Jesus says to the Father that eternal life is to "know you, the only true God..." In the former statement, I believe, the Father is acting as a Spokesperson, or mouthpiece, for the God-Being as a whole while in the latter, Jesus is addressing the Father in his capacity as representative of the whole God-Being. A similar situation obtains with regard to 1 Corinthians 8:6, where Paul writes that "for us there is but one God, the Father".
By adopting this terminology of one God-Being and three God-Persons, I believe I will be able to be true to the spirit of the Trinitarian concept of God while using language that does not degenerate into incoherence.
(Bible quotes from the New International Version.)
Wednesday 30 March 2016
The BIBLICAL doctrine of the Trinity...
...as opposed to the traditional one which, I believe, involves extra-biblical concepts which render it incoherent:
The Father is the only true God (John 17:3); the Son is in the Father and the Father is in the Son (John 14:11); the Son and the Father are one (John 10:30); whoever has seen the Son has seen the Father (John 14:9); the Son is the image of the invisible God (Colossians 1:15); the Son is the exact representation of God's being (Hebrews 1:3); the fullness of Deity dwells bodily in the Son (Colossians 2:9); if you lie to the Holy Spirit you are lying to God (Acts 5:4); the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of God and the Spirit of Christ (Romans 8:9).
Anything beyond these simple yet profound biblical statements about the unity of God and Christ in the Spirit (eg. notions of three distinct Persons each of whom constitutes the same one Being) is, in my opinion, pure speculation and should not be made into a requirement of orthodoxy.
No doubt many people would point to John 1:1 as an essential addition to the above list, which it most certainly is. I omitted it simply because of the ambiguity over how it should be translated. My preferred translation is 'what God was, the Word was' (New English Bible), as it takes into account the lack of a definite article (ho) before the word for God (theos) when applied to the Word (logos) - although I can't claim to have any real knowledge of Greek, biblical or otherwise.
The Father is the only true God (John 17:3); the Son is in the Father and the Father is in the Son (John 14:11); the Son and the Father are one (John 10:30); whoever has seen the Son has seen the Father (John 14:9); the Son is the image of the invisible God (Colossians 1:15); the Son is the exact representation of God's being (Hebrews 1:3); the fullness of Deity dwells bodily in the Son (Colossians 2:9); if you lie to the Holy Spirit you are lying to God (Acts 5:4); the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of God and the Spirit of Christ (Romans 8:9).
Anything beyond these simple yet profound biblical statements about the unity of God and Christ in the Spirit (eg. notions of three distinct Persons each of whom constitutes the same one Being) is, in my opinion, pure speculation and should not be made into a requirement of orthodoxy.
No doubt many people would point to John 1:1 as an essential addition to the above list, which it most certainly is. I omitted it simply because of the ambiguity over how it should be translated. My preferred translation is 'what God was, the Word was' (New English Bible), as it takes into account the lack of a definite article (ho) before the word for God (theos) when applied to the Word (logos) - although I can't claim to have any real knowledge of Greek, biblical or otherwise.
Thursday 24 March 2016
As you were...
Every now and then I get carried away with the desire not to be a heretic and I fall into the trap of coming up with a new configuration of some version of the doctrine of the Trinity (DOT) that I've already 'debunked' in the past, and allowing myself to be taken in by it for a little while, fooling myself that I have subjected the theory to proper analysis when in fact such is the psychological pleasure of feeling myself to be within the fold of Christian orthodoxy that I have, unconsciously, held myself back from employing the appropriate level of critical rigour.
Such was the case with my recent 'grammar of infinity' model of the Trinity (see previous post) which, once put through its analytical paces, revealed itself as a failure for all the usual reasons.
Basically, if there is something that there is only one of (God) then the Persons either are that thing that there is only one of - in which case there must be only one Person - or the Persons are not the thing that there is only one of - in which case they are not God. You just can't have it both ways!
In my GOI model, the thing that there was only one of was the extent of the divine attributes and, while all the Persons may share that same (infinite) extent to their attributes, none of them is identical to the extent of their attributes. It's the usual problem of the fact that while each of the Persons may share the one divine nature, it cannot be the case that each of them is the divine nature - so if the divine nature is God then the Persons are not God and if the divine nature is not God then the fact that there is only one of it does not help resolve the problem of the DOT.
Such was the case with my recent 'grammar of infinity' model of the Trinity (see previous post) which, once put through its analytical paces, revealed itself as a failure for all the usual reasons.
Basically, if there is something that there is only one of (God) then the Persons either are that thing that there is only one of - in which case there must be only one Person - or the Persons are not the thing that there is only one of - in which case they are not God. You just can't have it both ways!
In my GOI model, the thing that there was only one of was the extent of the divine attributes and, while all the Persons may share that same (infinite) extent to their attributes, none of them is identical to the extent of their attributes. It's the usual problem of the fact that while each of the Persons may share the one divine nature, it cannot be the case that each of them is the divine nature - so if the divine nature is God then the Persons are not God and if the divine nature is not God then the fact that there is only one of it does not help resolve the problem of the DOT.
Saturday 19 March 2016
Doctrine of the Trinity - the grammar of infinity
Throughout this blog I have shown how, up until now, I have found it impossible to come to an understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity (DOT) which is both logically coherent and (small 'o') orthodox.
Now, however, I seem to have arrived at a conception of the DOT which, while it admittedly involves some unusual use of grammar, does seem - to me at any rate - to actually make sense and not involve any heretical conclusions.
The model of the Trinity that I now espouse works like this:
Imagine three people - let's call them Tom, Dick and Harriet. Considered together they make up a group of three human beings. As a group they have roughly three times the strength that each of them has as an individual; for example, if Tom's car were to have a flat battery and need a push start, Tom might not be able, on his own, to push the car very far - but with the help of his friends, Dick and Harriet, he will do a much better job.
A similar situation obtains with regard to knowledge. True, there will be some overlap in terms of what each of them knows, but certainly each of them will know plenty of stuff that the other two don't, so their combined knowledge is much greater than that which each of them possesses as an individual.
Tom, Dick and Harriet probably aren't exactly the same size as each other but, roughly speaking, as a group they will occupy three times the space that each of them occupies as an individual.
A similar ratio of three to one will apply to all other areas of these three people's existence as a group.
The situation with regard to the divine Persons is, however, very different: each of them is omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent - therefore the power held by each of the individual Persons is no less than that held by the group as a whole; each Person has no less knowledge than the group and, since they are present everywhere, each Person occupies no less space than the three of them do together. The same situation obtains with regard to all the divine attributes. It is this phenomenon - the fact that each individual divine Person has exactly the same amount of power and knowledge, and occupies exactly the same amount of space etc, as the three divine Persons combined - that, I now believe, the DOT points to and signifies. Although the group (the Trinity) contains three Persons (because there are three subjects or 'I's) it contains only one set of infinite divine attributes held equally by all three Persons. Each of the Persons is God, yet because of the fact that each is equal to the three together, they do not amount to a plurality of 'Gods'.
In the past I have used a kind of 'interrogation' method to establish whether or not a purported explanation of the DOT is actually coherent. I would ask a set of questions such as the following:
Did God become incarnate as a human being? (to which the answer should be 'yes')
How many Gods are there? (the answer should, of course, be 'one')
So the one God became incarnate as a human being ('yes')
Is the Father the one God? ('yes')
So the Father is the one God who became incarnate as a human being? ('er... well, yes')
Did the Father become incarnate as a human being? ('no!')
So the one God who became incarnate as a human being did not become incarnate as a human being??
At this point I would consider the Trinity theory in question to be proven illogical and incoherent and therefore clearly not a true reflection of the nature of God. Up until now, no Trinity theory has passed my rigorous interrogation test!
However, I now think that, because it refers to a situation unlike any that is experienced in the finite sphere (in other words, because it is dealing with infinite qualities and quantities) the grammar employed in discussing the DOT should be of a special variety unlike that used in other situations; so the answers to the above questions should actually take something like the following form:
Did God become incarnate as a human being? ('well, one of Him did')
How many Gods are there? ('one, of course!')
So the one God became incarnate as a human being ('like I said, one of Him did') Is the Father the one God? (yes!) So the Father is the one God who became incarnate as a human being? ('He is one of the one God, one of whom became incarnate as a human being') Did the Father become incarnate as a human being? ('no')
The DOT teaches that there are three Persons of the one God, so an expression like 'one of the one God' simply means 'one Person of the one God'. It might seem that we should refer to God (being a combination of three Persons) as an 'it' rather than a 'He', but to me that seems to diminish God by implying that God is a thing whereas a being consisting of three Persons, far from being less than a person is, in fact, 'superpersonal'. I suppose we could use the pronoun 'them', but if the whole purpose of the DOT is to point to the fact that the three Persons, each of whom is God, do not - because of their infinite nature - amount to a plurality of 'Gods', then to refer to God as 'them' would seem to defeat this object. Hence, 'Him' seems the most appropriate pronoun to use. (Of course, I do not see God as male in the human sense, but both Father and Son are male terms and the Son has become incarnate as a human male. I do, however, think there may be a case for referring to the Holy Spirit as 'Her' - not because I think the Spirit is female in the human sense but simply to introduce at least an element of gender balance into our conception of the Godhead).
Now, however, I seem to have arrived at a conception of the DOT which, while it admittedly involves some unusual use of grammar, does seem - to me at any rate - to actually make sense and not involve any heretical conclusions.
The model of the Trinity that I now espouse works like this:
Imagine three people - let's call them Tom, Dick and Harriet. Considered together they make up a group of three human beings. As a group they have roughly three times the strength that each of them has as an individual; for example, if Tom's car were to have a flat battery and need a push start, Tom might not be able, on his own, to push the car very far - but with the help of his friends, Dick and Harriet, he will do a much better job.
A similar situation obtains with regard to knowledge. True, there will be some overlap in terms of what each of them knows, but certainly each of them will know plenty of stuff that the other two don't, so their combined knowledge is much greater than that which each of them possesses as an individual.
Tom, Dick and Harriet probably aren't exactly the same size as each other but, roughly speaking, as a group they will occupy three times the space that each of them occupies as an individual.
A similar ratio of three to one will apply to all other areas of these three people's existence as a group.
The situation with regard to the divine Persons is, however, very different: each of them is omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent - therefore the power held by each of the individual Persons is no less than that held by the group as a whole; each Person has no less knowledge than the group and, since they are present everywhere, each Person occupies no less space than the three of them do together. The same situation obtains with regard to all the divine attributes. It is this phenomenon - the fact that each individual divine Person has exactly the same amount of power and knowledge, and occupies exactly the same amount of space etc, as the three divine Persons combined - that, I now believe, the DOT points to and signifies. Although the group (the Trinity) contains three Persons (because there are three subjects or 'I's) it contains only one set of infinite divine attributes held equally by all three Persons. Each of the Persons is God, yet because of the fact that each is equal to the three together, they do not amount to a plurality of 'Gods'.
In the past I have used a kind of 'interrogation' method to establish whether or not a purported explanation of the DOT is actually coherent. I would ask a set of questions such as the following:
Did God become incarnate as a human being? (to which the answer should be 'yes')
How many Gods are there? (the answer should, of course, be 'one')
So the one God became incarnate as a human being ('yes')
Is the Father the one God? ('yes')
So the Father is the one God who became incarnate as a human being? ('er... well, yes')
Did the Father become incarnate as a human being? ('no!')
So the one God who became incarnate as a human being did not become incarnate as a human being??
At this point I would consider the Trinity theory in question to be proven illogical and incoherent and therefore clearly not a true reflection of the nature of God. Up until now, no Trinity theory has passed my rigorous interrogation test!
However, I now think that, because it refers to a situation unlike any that is experienced in the finite sphere (in other words, because it is dealing with infinite qualities and quantities) the grammar employed in discussing the DOT should be of a special variety unlike that used in other situations; so the answers to the above questions should actually take something like the following form:
Did God become incarnate as a human being? ('well, one of Him did')
How many Gods are there? ('one, of course!')
So the one God became incarnate as a human being ('like I said, one of Him did') Is the Father the one God? (yes!) So the Father is the one God who became incarnate as a human being? ('He is one of the one God, one of whom became incarnate as a human being') Did the Father become incarnate as a human being? ('no')
The DOT teaches that there are three Persons of the one God, so an expression like 'one of the one God' simply means 'one Person of the one God'. It might seem that we should refer to God (being a combination of three Persons) as an 'it' rather than a 'He', but to me that seems to diminish God by implying that God is a thing whereas a being consisting of three Persons, far from being less than a person is, in fact, 'superpersonal'. I suppose we could use the pronoun 'them', but if the whole purpose of the DOT is to point to the fact that the three Persons, each of whom is God, do not - because of their infinite nature - amount to a plurality of 'Gods', then to refer to God as 'them' would seem to defeat this object. Hence, 'Him' seems the most appropriate pronoun to use. (Of course, I do not see God as male in the human sense, but both Father and Son are male terms and the Son has become incarnate as a human male. I do, however, think there may be a case for referring to the Holy Spirit as 'Her' - not because I think the Spirit is female in the human sense but simply to introduce at least an element of gender balance into our conception of the Godhead).
Sunday 6 March 2016
Just in case you are interested...
...here are the links for my other blogs:
"Thoughts on What's Afoot" (latitudinous lucubrations and other stray cerebrations).
"Free Armenian Lessons" (short lessons in both Eastern and Western Armenian).
"Andrew's Art" (drawings and paintings including a few home-made greeting cards).
"Thoughts on What's Afoot" (latitudinous lucubrations and other stray cerebrations).
"Free Armenian Lessons" (short lessons in both Eastern and Western Armenian).
"Andrew's Art" (drawings and paintings including a few home-made greeting cards).
Saturday 13 February 2016
The two hands of God
The Church Father Irenaeus described the Son and Holy Spirit as the two 'hands' of God. That thought is certainly compatible with my own understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity.
When my hand is holding something, or pointing at something, it is actually me that is doing the holding or pointing, even though my hand is not identical to me. Similarly, when the Son or Spirit are acting or speaking it is actually God who, through them, is acting or speaking. It is in this sense, I believe, that we can speak of the Son and the Spirit as God - not in the strict sense of being identical to God, which is, in my opinion, applicable only to the Father.
As I've stated previously, while not being strictly identical to God, the Son and Spirit are certainly divine, by virtue of the fact that they are 'parts' or aspects of the one true God (the Father) - namely His Word and His Spirit.
When my hand is holding something, or pointing at something, it is actually me that is doing the holding or pointing, even though my hand is not identical to me. Similarly, when the Son or Spirit are acting or speaking it is actually God who, through them, is acting or speaking. It is in this sense, I believe, that we can speak of the Son and the Spirit as God - not in the strict sense of being identical to God, which is, in my opinion, applicable only to the Father.
As I've stated previously, while not being strictly identical to God, the Son and Spirit are certainly divine, by virtue of the fact that they are 'parts' or aspects of the one true God (the Father) - namely His Word and His Spirit.
Tuesday 19 January 2016
A simple statement of my symbolic understanding of the Trinity
My understanding of the nature of the relationship between the Father, Son and Spirit and of the nature of the Godhead can be summarised as follows:
1) The Father is God
2) The Son reveals God
3) The Spirit conveys (or communicates) God
4) There is only one God
1) The Father is God
2) The Son reveals God
3) The Spirit conveys (or communicates) God
4) There is only one God
Wednesday 13 January 2016
My conversation with Dale Tuggy
A few days ago I tweeted a link to my previous post and copied in Dale Tuggy, a philosopher specialising in Analytic Theology, Philosophical Theology, Philosophy of Religion and Early Modern Philosophy, who has taught in the Department of Philosophy at The State University of New York at Fredonia since 2000 and who runs the popular Trinities blog and podcast series, some of the episodes of which I have been listening to lately.
Mr Tuggy was good enough to respond to my tweet, and over the next couple of days I had a short conversation with him, via twitter, about the views I had expressed in my post.
The twitter conversation (complete with abbreviations!) is reproduced below. Dale Tuggy's words are in bold.
Me:
A coherent explanation of the Doctrine of #TheTrinity: http://luthersmarbles.blogspot.co.uk/2015/10/my-own-take-on-trinity.html?m=1 … #Christianity #Christian #theology #philosophy @DaleTuggy
Dale Tuggy:
There are many arguably coherent ways to parse the language, but most are mutually exclusive. Real problem is fit with the Bible.
Dale Tuggy (again):
Not coherent. Trin sposed to be monoth, but you say 3 Gods. Which in ur view is the one God - the Trinity or the Father?
Me:
Def Father, as per Jesus' words ('Only true God'). Son and Spirit are 'God of (or from) God' as per creed. 3 Gods but 1 div nat.
Dale Tuggy:
Not sure if you mean three Gods or three "God"s. Do you see the difference?
Me:
1 uncaused God (the Father), 2 'Gods' in a secondary sense, deriving their divinity from the Father. Do you think it's heretical?
Dale Tuggy:
No, I think that's subordinationist unitarianism, like that of Clarke, Novatian, or Origen. Not trin because one God not = Trinity
Me:
I just recapped on Clarke and I agree with his views, but they are actually not that different to some East Orth eg. Fr John Behr
Dale Tuggy:
I need to read more East. Orth. sources on the Trinity. I suspect they are ambivalent about whether God = Trinity vs. God = Father
Me:
I think they def more favourable to God=Father than Western trad is. Thanks for comments. Congrats on excellent blog and podcasts
(End of conversation)
Of course Dale Tuggy is right, the formula I came up with in my most recent post was never really going to pass muster as orthodox - at the end of the day it would mean that Christians are worshiping three Gods, even if all three do share the same divine nature. But I've never set any store by the argument that because there is only one divine nature then the three persons who share that nature must all be the same God. If possession of the divine nature makes a Person God, then if three Persons possess that nature there must be three Gods. So this idea about one Supreme God and two secondary Gods deriving their divinity from Him was the closest I could come to what I felt the Trinitarian language was trying to get at. And I'm glad Mr Tuggy mentioned Samuel Clarke because it made me check back on his views (I have come across them once before) and I realise that he too felt that this type of idea was the closest one could come to Trinitarianism while remaining coherent. Dale Tuggy calls this view Subordinationist Unitarianism, which I think is a better label than Tritheism, considering that I am not talking about three 'independent' or separate (as opposed to 'distinct') Gods.
Incidentally, I think that Father John Behr's (the Orthodox Priest who I mentioned in my penultimate tweet) attempt to explain the doctrine of the Trinity can only be rendered coherent if the Son/Word and Spirit are viewed as, in some sense, secondary deities deriving their divinity from the Father.
Every now and then I try to bring my view of the Trinity more into line with traditional orthodoxy - after all, who actually wants to be a heretic? (I prefer the word 'liberal' or even 'radical protestant'). None of these attempts have ever survived any serious scrutiny, though, and this latest one is no different. I do think, however, that the idea of one uncaused, true God, who is in turn the cause of the divinity of his Son and Spirit, is a better approximation to the way the New Testament writers and the earliest Christians appear to have understood the nature of the Godhead than the later Trinitarian theories of Athanasius which, it seems to me, are impossible to conceive of in any coherent or logically plausible way.
Mr Tuggy was good enough to respond to my tweet, and over the next couple of days I had a short conversation with him, via twitter, about the views I had expressed in my post.
The twitter conversation (complete with abbreviations!) is reproduced below. Dale Tuggy's words are in bold.
Me:
A coherent explanation of the Doctrine of #TheTrinity: http://luthersmarbles.blogspot.co.uk/2015/10/my-own-take-on-trinity.html?m=1 … #Christianity #Christian #theology #philosophy @DaleTuggy
Dale Tuggy:
There are many arguably coherent ways to parse the language, but most are mutually exclusive. Real problem is fit with the Bible.
Dale Tuggy (again):
Not coherent. Trin sposed to be monoth, but you say 3 Gods. Which in ur view is the one God - the Trinity or the Father?
Me:
Def Father, as per Jesus' words ('Only true God'). Son and Spirit are 'God of (or from) God' as per creed. 3 Gods but 1 div nat.
Dale Tuggy:
Not sure if you mean three Gods or three "God"s. Do you see the difference?
Me:
1 uncaused God (the Father), 2 'Gods' in a secondary sense, deriving their divinity from the Father. Do you think it's heretical?
Dale Tuggy:
No, I think that's subordinationist unitarianism, like that of Clarke, Novatian, or Origen. Not trin because one God not = Trinity
Me:
I just recapped on Clarke and I agree with his views, but they are actually not that different to some East Orth eg. Fr John Behr
Dale Tuggy:
I need to read more East. Orth. sources on the Trinity. I suspect they are ambivalent about whether God = Trinity vs. God = Father
Me:
I think they def more favourable to God=Father than Western trad is. Thanks for comments. Congrats on excellent blog and podcasts
(End of conversation)
Of course Dale Tuggy is right, the formula I came up with in my most recent post was never really going to pass muster as orthodox - at the end of the day it would mean that Christians are worshiping three Gods, even if all three do share the same divine nature. But I've never set any store by the argument that because there is only one divine nature then the three persons who share that nature must all be the same God. If possession of the divine nature makes a Person God, then if three Persons possess that nature there must be three Gods. So this idea about one Supreme God and two secondary Gods deriving their divinity from Him was the closest I could come to what I felt the Trinitarian language was trying to get at. And I'm glad Mr Tuggy mentioned Samuel Clarke because it made me check back on his views (I have come across them once before) and I realise that he too felt that this type of idea was the closest one could come to Trinitarianism while remaining coherent. Dale Tuggy calls this view Subordinationist Unitarianism, which I think is a better label than Tritheism, considering that I am not talking about three 'independent' or separate (as opposed to 'distinct') Gods.
Incidentally, I think that Father John Behr's (the Orthodox Priest who I mentioned in my penultimate tweet) attempt to explain the doctrine of the Trinity can only be rendered coherent if the Son/Word and Spirit are viewed as, in some sense, secondary deities deriving their divinity from the Father.
Every now and then I try to bring my view of the Trinity more into line with traditional orthodoxy - after all, who actually wants to be a heretic? (I prefer the word 'liberal' or even 'radical protestant'). None of these attempts have ever survived any serious scrutiny, though, and this latest one is no different. I do think, however, that the idea of one uncaused, true God, who is in turn the cause of the divinity of his Son and Spirit, is a better approximation to the way the New Testament writers and the earliest Christians appear to have understood the nature of the Godhead than the later Trinitarian theories of Athanasius which, it seems to me, are impossible to conceive of in any coherent or logically plausible way.
Sunday 10 January 2016
Clarification of my view on the Trinity
I stated in my initial post on this blog that I see the Trinity as more a case of one God in three 'presences' than three Persons: the 'only true God' (the Father, as described by Jesus) is present in the Son, by the Spirit.
The fact that both the Son and the Spirit share all the divine attributes of the Father (omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, infinite love or omnibenevolence etc.), however, means that it is not inappropriate to refer to them also by the title 'God'. I think the reason that the doctrine of the Trinity requires us to say that although all three Persons are God, yet there is only one God, is that if we were to say that there were three gods, that would imply that there were three 'independent' sources of supreme power, three seperate sets of divine attributes, etc.
By saying that although there are three who are God, there is only one God, we are constantly reminded that there is only one supreme 'power source', only one source of infinite love and knowledge etc. - that of the Father Almighty, maker of Heaven and Earth, as the Nicene Creed puts it. The Son, rather than being God in an unqualified sense like the Father, is 'true God from true God', to borrow another phrase from the creed (italics mine). Likewise with the Spirit. While the Father is uncaused, the Son (God's 'Word' or Wisdom, which became incarnate as Jesus Christ) is eternally generated and the Spirit eternally 'spirated' by the Father. As such, the Father is eternally the source of the divinity of the Son and the Spirit.
When we try to view the doctrine of the Trinity as a logical or mathematical idea it inevitably leads to incoherence if not outright cognitive dissonance. It is, rather, a religious concept expressed in symbolic language. Translated into straightforward, 'face value' terminology, I believe that what it is trying to express is the idea that while there is one supreme God, there are two other Gods who share all of the divine attributes of the supreme God because they derive them from Him.
The fact that both the Son and the Spirit share all the divine attributes of the Father (omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, infinite love or omnibenevolence etc.), however, means that it is not inappropriate to refer to them also by the title 'God'. I think the reason that the doctrine of the Trinity requires us to say that although all three Persons are God, yet there is only one God, is that if we were to say that there were three gods, that would imply that there were three 'independent' sources of supreme power, three seperate sets of divine attributes, etc.
By saying that although there are three who are God, there is only one God, we are constantly reminded that there is only one supreme 'power source', only one source of infinite love and knowledge etc. - that of the Father Almighty, maker of Heaven and Earth, as the Nicene Creed puts it. The Son, rather than being God in an unqualified sense like the Father, is 'true God from true God', to borrow another phrase from the creed (italics mine). Likewise with the Spirit. While the Father is uncaused, the Son (God's 'Word' or Wisdom, which became incarnate as Jesus Christ) is eternally generated and the Spirit eternally 'spirated' by the Father. As such, the Father is eternally the source of the divinity of the Son and the Spirit.
When we try to view the doctrine of the Trinity as a logical or mathematical idea it inevitably leads to incoherence if not outright cognitive dissonance. It is, rather, a religious concept expressed in symbolic language. Translated into straightforward, 'face value' terminology, I believe that what it is trying to express is the idea that while there is one supreme God, there are two other Gods who share all of the divine attributes of the supreme God because they derive them from Him.
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