...as opposed to the traditional one which, I believe, involves extra-biblical concepts which render it incoherent:
The Father is the only true God (John 17:3); the Son is in the Father and the Father is in the Son (John 14:11); the Son and the Father are one (John 10:30); whoever has seen the Son has seen the Father (John 14:9); the Son is the image of the invisible God (Colossians 1:15); the Son is the exact representation of God's being (Hebrews 1:3); the fullness of Deity dwells bodily in the Son (Colossians 2:9); if you lie to the Holy Spirit you are lying to God (Acts 5:4); the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of God and the Spirit of Christ (Romans 8:9).
Anything beyond these simple yet profound biblical statements about the unity of God and Christ in the Spirit (eg. notions of three distinct Persons each of whom constitutes the same one Being) is, in my opinion, pure speculation and should not be made into a requirement of orthodoxy.
No doubt many people would point to John 1:1 as an essential addition to the above list, which it most certainly is. I omitted it simply because of the ambiguity over how it should be translated. My preferred translation is 'what God was, the Word was' (New English Bible), as it takes into account the lack of a definite article (ho) before the word for God (theos) when applied to the Word (logos) - although I can't claim to have any real knowledge of Greek, biblical or otherwise.
Wednesday, 30 March 2016
Thursday, 24 March 2016
As you were...
Every now and then I get carried away with the desire not to be a heretic and I fall into the trap of coming up with a new configuration of some version of the doctrine of the Trinity (DOT) that I've already 'debunked' in the past, and allowing myself to be taken in by it for a little while, fooling myself that I have subjected the theory to proper analysis when in fact such is the psychological pleasure of feeling myself to be within the fold of Christian orthodoxy that I have, unconsciously, held myself back from employing the appropriate level of critical rigour.
Such was the case with my recent 'grammar of infinity' model of the Trinity (see previous post) which, once put through its analytical paces, revealed itself as a failure for all the usual reasons.
Basically, if there is something that there is only one of (God) then the Persons either are that thing that there is only one of - in which case there must be only one Person - or the Persons are not the thing that there is only one of - in which case they are not God. You just can't have it both ways!
In my GOI model, the thing that there was only one of was the extent of the divine attributes and, while all the Persons may share that same (infinite) extent to their attributes, none of them is identical to the extent of their attributes. It's the usual problem of the fact that while each of the Persons may share the one divine nature, it cannot be the case that each of them is the divine nature - so if the divine nature is God then the Persons are not God and if the divine nature is not God then the fact that there is only one of it does not help resolve the problem of the DOT.
Such was the case with my recent 'grammar of infinity' model of the Trinity (see previous post) which, once put through its analytical paces, revealed itself as a failure for all the usual reasons.
Basically, if there is something that there is only one of (God) then the Persons either are that thing that there is only one of - in which case there must be only one Person - or the Persons are not the thing that there is only one of - in which case they are not God. You just can't have it both ways!
In my GOI model, the thing that there was only one of was the extent of the divine attributes and, while all the Persons may share that same (infinite) extent to their attributes, none of them is identical to the extent of their attributes. It's the usual problem of the fact that while each of the Persons may share the one divine nature, it cannot be the case that each of them is the divine nature - so if the divine nature is God then the Persons are not God and if the divine nature is not God then the fact that there is only one of it does not help resolve the problem of the DOT.
Saturday, 19 March 2016
Doctrine of the Trinity - the grammar of infinity
Throughout this blog I have shown how, up until now, I have found it impossible to come to an understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity (DOT) which is both logically coherent and (small 'o') orthodox.
Now, however, I seem to have arrived at a conception of the DOT which, while it admittedly involves some unusual use of grammar, does seem - to me at any rate - to actually make sense and not involve any heretical conclusions.
The model of the Trinity that I now espouse works like this:
Imagine three people - let's call them Tom, Dick and Harriet. Considered together they make up a group of three human beings. As a group they have roughly three times the strength that each of them has as an individual; for example, if Tom's car were to have a flat battery and need a push start, Tom might not be able, on his own, to push the car very far - but with the help of his friends, Dick and Harriet, he will do a much better job.
A similar situation obtains with regard to knowledge. True, there will be some overlap in terms of what each of them knows, but certainly each of them will know plenty of stuff that the other two don't, so their combined knowledge is much greater than that which each of them possesses as an individual.
Tom, Dick and Harriet probably aren't exactly the same size as each other but, roughly speaking, as a group they will occupy three times the space that each of them occupies as an individual.
A similar ratio of three to one will apply to all other areas of these three people's existence as a group.
The situation with regard to the divine Persons is, however, very different: each of them is omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent - therefore the power held by each of the individual Persons is no less than that held by the group as a whole; each Person has no less knowledge than the group and, since they are present everywhere, each Person occupies no less space than the three of them do together. The same situation obtains with regard to all the divine attributes. It is this phenomenon - the fact that each individual divine Person has exactly the same amount of power and knowledge, and occupies exactly the same amount of space etc, as the three divine Persons combined - that, I now believe, the DOT points to and signifies. Although the group (the Trinity) contains three Persons (because there are three subjects or 'I's) it contains only one set of infinite divine attributes held equally by all three Persons. Each of the Persons is God, yet because of the fact that each is equal to the three together, they do not amount to a plurality of 'Gods'.
In the past I have used a kind of 'interrogation' method to establish whether or not a purported explanation of the DOT is actually coherent. I would ask a set of questions such as the following:
Did God become incarnate as a human being? (to which the answer should be 'yes')
How many Gods are there? (the answer should, of course, be 'one')
So the one God became incarnate as a human being ('yes')
Is the Father the one God? ('yes')
So the Father is the one God who became incarnate as a human being? ('er... well, yes')
Did the Father become incarnate as a human being? ('no!')
So the one God who became incarnate as a human being did not become incarnate as a human being??
At this point I would consider the Trinity theory in question to be proven illogical and incoherent and therefore clearly not a true reflection of the nature of God. Up until now, no Trinity theory has passed my rigorous interrogation test!
However, I now think that, because it refers to a situation unlike any that is experienced in the finite sphere (in other words, because it is dealing with infinite qualities and quantities) the grammar employed in discussing the DOT should be of a special variety unlike that used in other situations; so the answers to the above questions should actually take something like the following form:
Did God become incarnate as a human being? ('well, one of Him did')
How many Gods are there? ('one, of course!')
So the one God became incarnate as a human being ('like I said, one of Him did') Is the Father the one God? (yes!) So the Father is the one God who became incarnate as a human being? ('He is one of the one God, one of whom became incarnate as a human being') Did the Father become incarnate as a human being? ('no')
The DOT teaches that there are three Persons of the one God, so an expression like 'one of the one God' simply means 'one Person of the one God'. It might seem that we should refer to God (being a combination of three Persons) as an 'it' rather than a 'He', but to me that seems to diminish God by implying that God is a thing whereas a being consisting of three Persons, far from being less than a person is, in fact, 'superpersonal'. I suppose we could use the pronoun 'them', but if the whole purpose of the DOT is to point to the fact that the three Persons, each of whom is God, do not - because of their infinite nature - amount to a plurality of 'Gods', then to refer to God as 'them' would seem to defeat this object. Hence, 'Him' seems the most appropriate pronoun to use. (Of course, I do not see God as male in the human sense, but both Father and Son are male terms and the Son has become incarnate as a human male. I do, however, think there may be a case for referring to the Holy Spirit as 'Her' - not because I think the Spirit is female in the human sense but simply to introduce at least an element of gender balance into our conception of the Godhead).
Now, however, I seem to have arrived at a conception of the DOT which, while it admittedly involves some unusual use of grammar, does seem - to me at any rate - to actually make sense and not involve any heretical conclusions.
The model of the Trinity that I now espouse works like this:
Imagine three people - let's call them Tom, Dick and Harriet. Considered together they make up a group of three human beings. As a group they have roughly three times the strength that each of them has as an individual; for example, if Tom's car were to have a flat battery and need a push start, Tom might not be able, on his own, to push the car very far - but with the help of his friends, Dick and Harriet, he will do a much better job.
A similar situation obtains with regard to knowledge. True, there will be some overlap in terms of what each of them knows, but certainly each of them will know plenty of stuff that the other two don't, so their combined knowledge is much greater than that which each of them possesses as an individual.
Tom, Dick and Harriet probably aren't exactly the same size as each other but, roughly speaking, as a group they will occupy three times the space that each of them occupies as an individual.
A similar ratio of three to one will apply to all other areas of these three people's existence as a group.
The situation with regard to the divine Persons is, however, very different: each of them is omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent - therefore the power held by each of the individual Persons is no less than that held by the group as a whole; each Person has no less knowledge than the group and, since they are present everywhere, each Person occupies no less space than the three of them do together. The same situation obtains with regard to all the divine attributes. It is this phenomenon - the fact that each individual divine Person has exactly the same amount of power and knowledge, and occupies exactly the same amount of space etc, as the three divine Persons combined - that, I now believe, the DOT points to and signifies. Although the group (the Trinity) contains three Persons (because there are three subjects or 'I's) it contains only one set of infinite divine attributes held equally by all three Persons. Each of the Persons is God, yet because of the fact that each is equal to the three together, they do not amount to a plurality of 'Gods'.
In the past I have used a kind of 'interrogation' method to establish whether or not a purported explanation of the DOT is actually coherent. I would ask a set of questions such as the following:
Did God become incarnate as a human being? (to which the answer should be 'yes')
How many Gods are there? (the answer should, of course, be 'one')
So the one God became incarnate as a human being ('yes')
Is the Father the one God? ('yes')
So the Father is the one God who became incarnate as a human being? ('er... well, yes')
Did the Father become incarnate as a human being? ('no!')
So the one God who became incarnate as a human being did not become incarnate as a human being??
At this point I would consider the Trinity theory in question to be proven illogical and incoherent and therefore clearly not a true reflection of the nature of God. Up until now, no Trinity theory has passed my rigorous interrogation test!
However, I now think that, because it refers to a situation unlike any that is experienced in the finite sphere (in other words, because it is dealing with infinite qualities and quantities) the grammar employed in discussing the DOT should be of a special variety unlike that used in other situations; so the answers to the above questions should actually take something like the following form:
Did God become incarnate as a human being? ('well, one of Him did')
How many Gods are there? ('one, of course!')
So the one God became incarnate as a human being ('like I said, one of Him did') Is the Father the one God? (yes!) So the Father is the one God who became incarnate as a human being? ('He is one of the one God, one of whom became incarnate as a human being') Did the Father become incarnate as a human being? ('no')
The DOT teaches that there are three Persons of the one God, so an expression like 'one of the one God' simply means 'one Person of the one God'. It might seem that we should refer to God (being a combination of three Persons) as an 'it' rather than a 'He', but to me that seems to diminish God by implying that God is a thing whereas a being consisting of three Persons, far from being less than a person is, in fact, 'superpersonal'. I suppose we could use the pronoun 'them', but if the whole purpose of the DOT is to point to the fact that the three Persons, each of whom is God, do not - because of their infinite nature - amount to a plurality of 'Gods', then to refer to God as 'them' would seem to defeat this object. Hence, 'Him' seems the most appropriate pronoun to use. (Of course, I do not see God as male in the human sense, but both Father and Son are male terms and the Son has become incarnate as a human male. I do, however, think there may be a case for referring to the Holy Spirit as 'Her' - not because I think the Spirit is female in the human sense but simply to introduce at least an element of gender balance into our conception of the Godhead).
Sunday, 6 March 2016
Just in case you are interested...
...here are the links for my other blogs:
"Thoughts on What's Afoot" (latitudinous lucubrations and other stray cerebrations).
"Free Armenian Lessons" (short lessons in both Eastern and Western Armenian).
"Andrew's Art" (drawings and paintings including a few home-made greeting cards).
"Thoughts on What's Afoot" (latitudinous lucubrations and other stray cerebrations).
"Free Armenian Lessons" (short lessons in both Eastern and Western Armenian).
"Andrew's Art" (drawings and paintings including a few home-made greeting cards).
Saturday, 13 February 2016
The two hands of God
The Church Father Irenaeus described the Son and Holy Spirit as the two 'hands' of God. That thought is certainly compatible with my own understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity.
When my hand is holding something, or pointing at something, it is actually me that is doing the holding or pointing, even though my hand is not identical to me. Similarly, when the Son or Spirit are acting or speaking it is actually God who, through them, is acting or speaking. It is in this sense, I believe, that we can speak of the Son and the Spirit as God - not in the strict sense of being identical to God, which is, in my opinion, applicable only to the Father.
As I've stated previously, while not being strictly identical to God, the Son and Spirit are certainly divine, by virtue of the fact that they are 'parts' or aspects of the one true God (the Father) - namely His Word and His Spirit.
When my hand is holding something, or pointing at something, it is actually me that is doing the holding or pointing, even though my hand is not identical to me. Similarly, when the Son or Spirit are acting or speaking it is actually God who, through them, is acting or speaking. It is in this sense, I believe, that we can speak of the Son and the Spirit as God - not in the strict sense of being identical to God, which is, in my opinion, applicable only to the Father.
As I've stated previously, while not being strictly identical to God, the Son and Spirit are certainly divine, by virtue of the fact that they are 'parts' or aspects of the one true God (the Father) - namely His Word and His Spirit.
Tuesday, 19 January 2016
A simple statement of my symbolic understanding of the Trinity
My understanding of the nature of the relationship between the Father, Son and Spirit and of the nature of the Godhead can be summarised as follows:
1) The Father is God
2) The Son reveals God
3) The Spirit conveys (or communicates) God
4) There is only one God
1) The Father is God
2) The Son reveals God
3) The Spirit conveys (or communicates) God
4) There is only one God
Wednesday, 13 January 2016
My conversation with Dale Tuggy
A few days ago I tweeted a link to my previous post and copied in Dale Tuggy, a philosopher specialising in Analytic Theology, Philosophical Theology, Philosophy of Religion and Early Modern Philosophy, who has taught in the Department of Philosophy at The State University of New York at Fredonia since 2000 and who runs the popular Trinities blog and podcast series, some of the episodes of which I have been listening to lately.
Mr Tuggy was good enough to respond to my tweet, and over the next couple of days I had a short conversation with him, via twitter, about the views I had expressed in my post.
The twitter conversation (complete with abbreviations!) is reproduced below. Dale Tuggy's words are in bold.
Me:
A coherent explanation of the Doctrine of #TheTrinity: http://luthersmarbles.blogspot.co.uk/2015/10/my-own-take-on-trinity.html?m=1 … #Christianity #Christian #theology #philosophy @DaleTuggy
Dale Tuggy:
There are many arguably coherent ways to parse the language, but most are mutually exclusive. Real problem is fit with the Bible.
Dale Tuggy (again):
Not coherent. Trin sposed to be monoth, but you say 3 Gods. Which in ur view is the one God - the Trinity or the Father?
Me:
Def Father, as per Jesus' words ('Only true God'). Son and Spirit are 'God of (or from) God' as per creed. 3 Gods but 1 div nat.
Dale Tuggy:
Not sure if you mean three Gods or three "God"s. Do you see the difference?
Me:
1 uncaused God (the Father), 2 'Gods' in a secondary sense, deriving their divinity from the Father. Do you think it's heretical?
Dale Tuggy:
No, I think that's subordinationist unitarianism, like that of Clarke, Novatian, or Origen. Not trin because one God not = Trinity
Me:
I just recapped on Clarke and I agree with his views, but they are actually not that different to some East Orth eg. Fr John Behr
Dale Tuggy:
I need to read more East. Orth. sources on the Trinity. I suspect they are ambivalent about whether God = Trinity vs. God = Father
Me:
I think they def more favourable to God=Father than Western trad is. Thanks for comments. Congrats on excellent blog and podcasts
(End of conversation)
Of course Dale Tuggy is right, the formula I came up with in my most recent post was never really going to pass muster as orthodox - at the end of the day it would mean that Christians are worshiping three Gods, even if all three do share the same divine nature. But I've never set any store by the argument that because there is only one divine nature then the three persons who share that nature must all be the same God. If possession of the divine nature makes a Person God, then if three Persons possess that nature there must be three Gods. So this idea about one Supreme God and two secondary Gods deriving their divinity from Him was the closest I could come to what I felt the Trinitarian language was trying to get at. And I'm glad Mr Tuggy mentioned Samuel Clarke because it made me check back on his views (I have come across them once before) and I realise that he too felt that this type of idea was the closest one could come to Trinitarianism while remaining coherent. Dale Tuggy calls this view Subordinationist Unitarianism, which I think is a better label than Tritheism, considering that I am not talking about three 'independent' or separate (as opposed to 'distinct') Gods.
Incidentally, I think that Father John Behr's (the Orthodox Priest who I mentioned in my penultimate tweet) attempt to explain the doctrine of the Trinity can only be rendered coherent if the Son/Word and Spirit are viewed as, in some sense, secondary deities deriving their divinity from the Father.
Every now and then I try to bring my view of the Trinity more into line with traditional orthodoxy - after all, who actually wants to be a heretic? (I prefer the word 'liberal' or even 'radical protestant'). None of these attempts have ever survived any serious scrutiny, though, and this latest one is no different. I do think, however, that the idea of one uncaused, true God, who is in turn the cause of the divinity of his Son and Spirit, is a better approximation to the way the New Testament writers and the earliest Christians appear to have understood the nature of the Godhead than the later Trinitarian theories of Athanasius which, it seems to me, are impossible to conceive of in any coherent or logically plausible way.
Mr Tuggy was good enough to respond to my tweet, and over the next couple of days I had a short conversation with him, via twitter, about the views I had expressed in my post.
The twitter conversation (complete with abbreviations!) is reproduced below. Dale Tuggy's words are in bold.
Me:
A coherent explanation of the Doctrine of #TheTrinity: http://luthersmarbles.blogspot.co.uk/2015/10/my-own-take-on-trinity.html?m=1 … #Christianity #Christian #theology #philosophy @DaleTuggy
Dale Tuggy:
There are many arguably coherent ways to parse the language, but most are mutually exclusive. Real problem is fit with the Bible.
Dale Tuggy (again):
Not coherent. Trin sposed to be monoth, but you say 3 Gods. Which in ur view is the one God - the Trinity or the Father?
Me:
Def Father, as per Jesus' words ('Only true God'). Son and Spirit are 'God of (or from) God' as per creed. 3 Gods but 1 div nat.
Dale Tuggy:
Not sure if you mean three Gods or three "God"s. Do you see the difference?
Me:
1 uncaused God (the Father), 2 'Gods' in a secondary sense, deriving their divinity from the Father. Do you think it's heretical?
Dale Tuggy:
No, I think that's subordinationist unitarianism, like that of Clarke, Novatian, or Origen. Not trin because one God not = Trinity
Me:
I just recapped on Clarke and I agree with his views, but they are actually not that different to some East Orth eg. Fr John Behr
Dale Tuggy:
I need to read more East. Orth. sources on the Trinity. I suspect they are ambivalent about whether God = Trinity vs. God = Father
Me:
I think they def more favourable to God=Father than Western trad is. Thanks for comments. Congrats on excellent blog and podcasts
(End of conversation)
Of course Dale Tuggy is right, the formula I came up with in my most recent post was never really going to pass muster as orthodox - at the end of the day it would mean that Christians are worshiping three Gods, even if all three do share the same divine nature. But I've never set any store by the argument that because there is only one divine nature then the three persons who share that nature must all be the same God. If possession of the divine nature makes a Person God, then if three Persons possess that nature there must be three Gods. So this idea about one Supreme God and two secondary Gods deriving their divinity from Him was the closest I could come to what I felt the Trinitarian language was trying to get at. And I'm glad Mr Tuggy mentioned Samuel Clarke because it made me check back on his views (I have come across them once before) and I realise that he too felt that this type of idea was the closest one could come to Trinitarianism while remaining coherent. Dale Tuggy calls this view Subordinationist Unitarianism, which I think is a better label than Tritheism, considering that I am not talking about three 'independent' or separate (as opposed to 'distinct') Gods.
Incidentally, I think that Father John Behr's (the Orthodox Priest who I mentioned in my penultimate tweet) attempt to explain the doctrine of the Trinity can only be rendered coherent if the Son/Word and Spirit are viewed as, in some sense, secondary deities deriving their divinity from the Father.
Every now and then I try to bring my view of the Trinity more into line with traditional orthodoxy - after all, who actually wants to be a heretic? (I prefer the word 'liberal' or even 'radical protestant'). None of these attempts have ever survived any serious scrutiny, though, and this latest one is no different. I do think, however, that the idea of one uncaused, true God, who is in turn the cause of the divinity of his Son and Spirit, is a better approximation to the way the New Testament writers and the earliest Christians appear to have understood the nature of the Godhead than the later Trinitarian theories of Athanasius which, it seems to me, are impossible to conceive of in any coherent or logically plausible way.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)