I have mentioned in a previous post that the Latin word 'persona' (from which we derive the English word 'person') is itself derived from a Greek word which originally meant 'mask' (as in the mask worn by an actor on the stage. In this post, I propose the word 'guise' (not to be confused with disguise) as an appropriate substitute for the word that is usually rendered 'Person' when referring to the trinitarian nature of God. The traditional formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity involves the concept of God as three Persons in one Being. I am suggesting, instead, the idea of God as one Person (in the modern sense of the word, ie. an individual conscious entity, a self) in three guises.
The "only true God" (John 17:3) is the Father, but we encounter him in two other guises: firstly, He is fully present in the life and teachings of Jesus and, secondly, He is fully present in the form of (or, rather, by means of) His Spirit (the same Spirit which was, and is, present in Jesus). When we encounter God in the life and teachings of Jesus, rather than call Him the Father, we refer to Him as the Word (see John 1) or, since Jesus' relationship with God was so utterly intimate that He was able to say "I and the Father are One", and Jesus is, in a unique way, God's Son, we can also refer to God in this guise as the Son - but that is not to imply that Jesus the man is actually God himself, or that Jesus and the Father are the same Person, only that God is fully present in Jesus and in his life and ministry (see 2 Corinthians 5:19).
When we encounter God in the guise of the Spirit then we refer to Him as such, ie. as the Spirit, rather than as the Father.
I think this understanding of God can be distinguished from modalism/sabellianism, because in the modalist idea of God, the Father and the Son (Jesus) are considered to be the same Person and this, perhaps, is the reason for modalism being declared a heresy, since it would mean that when Jesus prays to the Father it is actually God praying to Himself. The model that I am proposing does not, however, suffer from this problem.
Actually, all of this is really just another way of stating the position I set out with my very first post on this blog, the idea of one God in three presences.
Wednesday, 11 January 2017
Saturday, 10 September 2016
More 'Symbolic Trinitarianism'
Imagine that, in a General Election, each of the three main UK parties gets exactly one third of the vote. As a result it is agreed that the three party leaders (Theresa May, Jeremy Corbyn and Tim Farron) will share the role of Prime Minister. Not only that, but, by some miracle, it turns out that all three of them agree 100% on every single issue imaginable so that every action or decision of one of the three is fully concurred with by the other two. Furthermore, due to the wonders of modern technology they are constantly linked to each other by an online connection which means that any conversation one of them takes part in is instantaneously seen and heard - and, naturally, concurred with - by the other two.
In the situation described above, would it be legitimate to say that although each of the three party leaders is Prime Minister, there is actually only one Prime Minister because each of the three share exactly the same power and knowledge and - because of their absolute agreement on all possible issues - there is no possibility of conflict, rivalry or disagreement between them?
I think that this type of model is one way to make some kind of sense out of the doctrine of the Trinity. Each of the Divine Persons shares the one office of God (ie. the office of supreme ruler of the universe). Since each of the Persons fully possesses all the divine powers and attributes (ie. each is fully omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient, omnibenevolent etc.) and since, because of the infinite nature of the divine attributes, each individual Person has these attributes to the exact same degree as do the three of them combined, and since there is no possibility of disagreement or rivalry between them, perhaps it is legitimate to symbolise this situation by referring to each of the Persons as God while simultaneously asserting that there is only one God.
A similar model is to think of God as a Composite Being comprised of three inseparable Divine Persons and to assert that each of the Persons is fully God even though none of them is all of God. Again, this is to symbolise the fact that each each of the Persons fully possesses all the divine powers and attributes (ie. each is fully omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient, omnibenevolent etc.) and that, because of the infinite nature of the divine attributes, each individual Person has these attributes to the exact same degree as do the three of them combined, and also that there is no possibility of disagreement or rivalry between the Persons.
Personally, I incline more towards the first of these models because of my (biblically based) belief that the Father is "the only true God" while the Son and Spirit share fully in His divine power and attributes.
Of course, neither of these models can explain how God could literally be both one Being and three Persons simultaneously. For example, using the first model, imagine one of the Prime Ministerial Persons has an egg thown at him/her. In that case, it would be possible to say that the Prime Minister both did and did not get splatted with egg yolk (depending on which of the Persons one is considering). Yet it is logically impossible for the same thing to be both 'X' and 'not X' simultaneously.
In the situation described above, would it be legitimate to say that although each of the three party leaders is Prime Minister, there is actually only one Prime Minister because each of the three share exactly the same power and knowledge and - because of their absolute agreement on all possible issues - there is no possibility of conflict, rivalry or disagreement between them?
I think that this type of model is one way to make some kind of sense out of the doctrine of the Trinity. Each of the Divine Persons shares the one office of God (ie. the office of supreme ruler of the universe). Since each of the Persons fully possesses all the divine powers and attributes (ie. each is fully omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient, omnibenevolent etc.) and since, because of the infinite nature of the divine attributes, each individual Person has these attributes to the exact same degree as do the three of them combined, and since there is no possibility of disagreement or rivalry between them, perhaps it is legitimate to symbolise this situation by referring to each of the Persons as God while simultaneously asserting that there is only one God.
A similar model is to think of God as a Composite Being comprised of three inseparable Divine Persons and to assert that each of the Persons is fully God even though none of them is all of God. Again, this is to symbolise the fact that each each of the Persons fully possesses all the divine powers and attributes (ie. each is fully omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient, omnibenevolent etc.) and that, because of the infinite nature of the divine attributes, each individual Person has these attributes to the exact same degree as do the three of them combined, and also that there is no possibility of disagreement or rivalry between the Persons.
Personally, I incline more towards the first of these models because of my (biblically based) belief that the Father is "the only true God" while the Son and Spirit share fully in His divine power and attributes.
Of course, neither of these models can explain how God could literally be both one Being and three Persons simultaneously. For example, using the first model, imagine one of the Prime Ministerial Persons has an egg thown at him/her. In that case, it would be possible to say that the Prime Minister both did and did not get splatted with egg yolk (depending on which of the Persons one is considering). Yet it is logically impossible for the same thing to be both 'X' and 'not X' simultaneously.
Friday, 9 September 2016
Group names and collective entities
Most of the top premier league football clubs have massive squads of players as well as many non-playing staff. But when 11 members of, say, Manchester United, travel to another team's ground for an away match, we say that Manchester United (not 'some of Manchester United' or 'part of Manchester United') have come to play.
Similarly, imagine a pop group (let's invent one - we'll call them 'The Bloggers') has five members. If one of the members gets sick and the remaining four do a gig, we still say that the Bloggers (not some of the Bloggers or part of the Bloggers) are performing.
If Mr and Mrs Smith and two of their four children turn up at my house I will probably inform my wife that "the Smith family have arrived", rather than denoting them as 'some of the Smith family' or 'part of the Smith family'.
In these cases, a part of the collective entity (team/group/family)possesses all the essence of the whole and (in the case of the football team or pop group) is authorised by the whole to use the official name of the whole.
How far these examples are useful to understanding the Doctrine of the Trinity (by demonstrating that a part of an entity can be legitimately designated by the same term used to denote the entity in its entirety) is debatable, however. I'm not sure we would ever call one footballer by the name of his team or one pop group member by the name of the group. And if Mr Smith popped over for lunch I wouldn't describe my guest as 'the Smith family'. It seems that what these examples consist of is group names, and that such names can be equally applied to the whole of the group or to a part of the group but never to a 'non-group', ie. they cannot be applied to an individual (such as a Person).
Similarly, imagine a pop group (let's invent one - we'll call them 'The Bloggers') has five members. If one of the members gets sick and the remaining four do a gig, we still say that the Bloggers (not some of the Bloggers or part of the Bloggers) are performing.
If Mr and Mrs Smith and two of their four children turn up at my house I will probably inform my wife that "the Smith family have arrived", rather than denoting them as 'some of the Smith family' or 'part of the Smith family'.
In these cases, a part of the collective entity (team/group/family)possesses all the essence of the whole and (in the case of the football team or pop group) is authorised by the whole to use the official name of the whole.
How far these examples are useful to understanding the Doctrine of the Trinity (by demonstrating that a part of an entity can be legitimately designated by the same term used to denote the entity in its entirety) is debatable, however. I'm not sure we would ever call one footballer by the name of his team or one pop group member by the name of the group. And if Mr Smith popped over for lunch I wouldn't describe my guest as 'the Smith family'. It seems that what these examples consist of is group names, and that such names can be equally applied to the whole of the group or to a part of the group but never to a 'non-group', ie. they cannot be applied to an individual (such as a Person).
Wednesday, 24 August 2016
Is God a set of attributes?
If we were to conveive of the word 'God' as referring to a set of conditions, qualities or attributes, there would cease to be a problem with understanding the doctrine of the trinity. I have thought of several analogies that could work on this basis. For example, there can be many instances of the English alphabet (in a school textbook, a poster on a classroom wall, a children's song etc). Each of them is a true instance of the English alphabet yet there is only one English alphabet.
There could be several versions of the National Anthem, yet there would still be only one National Anthem.
The play I am watching at the theatre in London is 'Hamlet'. The play you are watching in New York is also 'Hamlet'. Yet there is only one play called 'Hamlet'.
What these things have in common is that they are sets of symbols, sounds or words that can be arranged or reproduced in various ways so that each arrangement is a distinct version of the one set.
On this basis, one could resolve the problem of the apparent incoherence of the doctrine of the Trinity by conceiving of God as a set of divine qualities (say, omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence and omnibenevolence) and then positing each of the three Persons as a distinct, personalised instance (or personification) of that set of qualities, each one comprising a different 'arrangement' of the entire set.
I do not believe, however, that this would be a viable approach, since Christians have always conveived of the one God as a concrete Being, not an abstract set of qualities or attributes. A set of qualities cannot be personal (or 'superpersonal') even if 'personality' or 'personalness' is one of the qualities in the set. I know of no instance in the English language where a set of qualities or attributes could be described as 'him' or 'her', no matter how many people it is personified by.
There could be several versions of the National Anthem, yet there would still be only one National Anthem.
The play I am watching at the theatre in London is 'Hamlet'. The play you are watching in New York is also 'Hamlet'. Yet there is only one play called 'Hamlet'.
What these things have in common is that they are sets of symbols, sounds or words that can be arranged or reproduced in various ways so that each arrangement is a distinct version of the one set.
On this basis, one could resolve the problem of the apparent incoherence of the doctrine of the Trinity by conceiving of God as a set of divine qualities (say, omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence and omnibenevolence) and then positing each of the three Persons as a distinct, personalised instance (or personification) of that set of qualities, each one comprising a different 'arrangement' of the entire set.
I do not believe, however, that this would be a viable approach, since Christians have always conveived of the one God as a concrete Being, not an abstract set of qualities or attributes. A set of qualities cannot be personal (or 'superpersonal') even if 'personality' or 'personalness' is one of the qualities in the set. I know of no instance in the English language where a set of qualities or attributes could be described as 'him' or 'her', no matter how many people it is personified by.
Tuesday, 23 August 2016
Embracing paradox
Recently, I was reading about the existentialist philospher Kierkegaard's view that ultimate truth is impossible for human beings to grasp because we do not have the necessary conceptual framework. This is not the same as when people say that 'God is beyond logic'. Rather, it is to say that the truth about God is perfectly logical within the context of the infinite and eternal realm that God inhabits but that, being finite creatures bound by space and time, what we are able to grasp of the truth about God appears to us to be paradoxical.
Imagine living in a two dimensional world like that described by C.S. Lewis in the passage from Mere Christianity that I quoted in my second post on this blog. Now imagine looking at two squares, the first measuring 2" x 2", the second measuring 6" x 6". The idea that the first of these shapes could be larger than the second would seem totally illogical and against all the rules of mathematics. This is because, as someone only capable of thinking in two dimensions, I am aware of the size in terms of area, but not in terms of volume, which would be totally beyond my experience or even ability to conceptualise. In actual fact it is perfectly possible for the first shape to be larger than the second if, for example, as well as its length and width of 2" x 2", it had a height of, say, 10" while the second shape had a height of only 1". In that case, the volume of the first shape (which is in actuality a cube rather than a square) would be 40" (2" x 2" x 10") while that of the second shape would be only 36" (6" x 6" x 1").
Ultimately, however, I do not think Kierkegaard's idea that eternal truth appears to finite minds as paradox can be used as a way of justifying belief in the doctrine of the Trinity. It doesn't make any difference how much we fail to understand about the nature of the Father or of the Son (or simply of the Being called God) or how impossible it is to grasp who or what they are in themselves as opposed to how they appear to our limited finite minds. The relevant issue is the idea that neither the Father nor the Son is the other, yet each of them is the same Being, namely God. The assertion that a=/=b yet a=x and b=x is just as illogical, no matter what a,b and x represent. Of course, if the word 'is' had some special meaning in the infinite or eternal dimension which was incapable of being grasped by our finite minds then it would be possible to say that the doctrine of the Trinity is true in some sense that it is beyond our capacity as finite beings to grasp. But the word 'is' was invented by us finite, time/space-bound creatures to serve a particular linguistic role, to convey the idea of identity as understood by us finite, time/space-bound creatures. It's meaning is defined by us and us alone. Defenders of the doctrine of the Trinity cannot, therefore, appeal to the infinite, eternal realm as an escape route from the incoherence and internally contradictory nature of that doctrine.
Imagine living in a two dimensional world like that described by C.S. Lewis in the passage from Mere Christianity that I quoted in my second post on this blog. Now imagine looking at two squares, the first measuring 2" x 2", the second measuring 6" x 6". The idea that the first of these shapes could be larger than the second would seem totally illogical and against all the rules of mathematics. This is because, as someone only capable of thinking in two dimensions, I am aware of the size in terms of area, but not in terms of volume, which would be totally beyond my experience or even ability to conceptualise. In actual fact it is perfectly possible for the first shape to be larger than the second if, for example, as well as its length and width of 2" x 2", it had a height of, say, 10" while the second shape had a height of only 1". In that case, the volume of the first shape (which is in actuality a cube rather than a square) would be 40" (2" x 2" x 10") while that of the second shape would be only 36" (6" x 6" x 1").
Ultimately, however, I do not think Kierkegaard's idea that eternal truth appears to finite minds as paradox can be used as a way of justifying belief in the doctrine of the Trinity. It doesn't make any difference how much we fail to understand about the nature of the Father or of the Son (or simply of the Being called God) or how impossible it is to grasp who or what they are in themselves as opposed to how they appear to our limited finite minds. The relevant issue is the idea that neither the Father nor the Son is the other, yet each of them is the same Being, namely God. The assertion that a=/=b yet a=x and b=x is just as illogical, no matter what a,b and x represent. Of course, if the word 'is' had some special meaning in the infinite or eternal dimension which was incapable of being grasped by our finite minds then it would be possible to say that the doctrine of the Trinity is true in some sense that it is beyond our capacity as finite beings to grasp. But the word 'is' was invented by us finite, time/space-bound creatures to serve a particular linguistic role, to convey the idea of identity as understood by us finite, time/space-bound creatures. It's meaning is defined by us and us alone. Defenders of the doctrine of the Trinity cannot, therefore, appeal to the infinite, eternal realm as an escape route from the incoherence and internally contradictory nature of that doctrine.
Wednesday, 4 May 2016
As you were... again!
My idea of describing the persons of the Trinity as God-Persons doesn't really resolve the problem of the Trinity at all. Maybe it sidesteps the difficulties involved but it certainly doesn't make it possible for me to call myself an orthodox Trinitarian. The reason is that a God-Person is not God. A God-Person is not something that there is only one of, because clearly there are three God-Persons. Therefore, as there is only one God, a God-Person cannot be God (or rather, not all three of them can). So what is a God-Person, if not God? There are two possibilities; a God-Person is either a god (one of two or perhaps three) or someone who, while not actually being God, is divine. Neither of these possibilities would be acceptable to an orthodox Trinitarian as they believe that the Son and the Spirit are not merely divine and that neither are they a plurality of gods, but that each of them, along with the Father, is the one true God.
So, it seems there is really no change in my position at all. I'm still someone who believes that the one God is the Father and that the doctrine of the Trinity is not literally true. My view of the DOT is still a 'liberal' one (or, as I sometimes prefer to say, a radical Protestant one) and I'm okay with that!
So, it seems there is really no change in my position at all. I'm still someone who believes that the one God is the Father and that the doctrine of the Trinity is not literally true. My view of the DOT is still a 'liberal' one (or, as I sometimes prefer to say, a radical Protestant one) and I'm okay with that!
Thursday, 28 April 2016
One God-Being, three God-Persons (part 2)
In my previous post, I suggested that "the God-Person known as the Father sometimes speaks on behalf of, and represents, the group (or family) known as the God-Being." However, on reflection I think this is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, it means that each of the God-Persons constitutes only one third of the God-Being which raises the question of whether or not any of them possesses the fullness of the divine nature. Secondly, The import of biblical passages which reference the Father as the one, or the only, true God seems weakened by the notion that they really mean that He merely represents the one true God.
Since I believe (and stated in my previous post) that the Father is the source of the divine nature of the Son and Holy Spirit, it seems appropriate to say that the Father Himself is the God-Being (as well as being one of the God-Persons) while the other two God-Persons, since they derive their divine nature from the Father, can be said to participate in His Being.
To use a rather outlandish example, imagine that the entire human race has been wiped out in some freak nuclear accident apart from one survivor - a genius scientist named Tom. Tom has two best friends called Dick and Harry and although he couldn't completely save them, being a scientific genius he did manage to preserve each of their brains which he now keeps in two jars of formaldehyde. Again, being a scientific genius, Tom has managed to wire each of his two friends' brains up to his own body so that each of them is now able to see through Tom's eyes, to speak through his mouth and even to walk around, pick things up etc, using Tom's feet, hands and limbs. Fortunately, Tom Dick and Harry have similar tastes in terms of where they want to go and what they want to do, so there are no conflicts over how to make use of Tom's body. In this bizarre scenario, I think it would be appropriate to say that there are three human persons - Tom, Dick and Harry - but only one human being, namely Tom, although the other two persons participate in Tom's being through having access to his human physical attributes. In other words they derive the non-personal aspects of their human nature from Tom. Likewise, in the case of the Holy Trinity we can say that there are three God-Persons and one God-Being, the Father, from whom the other two God-Persons derive their divine nature and attributes.
The scripture passages which speak of the Father as the one true God do so because he is the only true God-Being. However, all three God-Persons, in equal measure, possess and partake of the nature and attributes of that Being just as, in my analogy, the three human persons, Tom, Dick and Harry, share in the one human nature which is derived from the one surviving human being, Tom.
Since I believe (and stated in my previous post) that the Father is the source of the divine nature of the Son and Holy Spirit, it seems appropriate to say that the Father Himself is the God-Being (as well as being one of the God-Persons) while the other two God-Persons, since they derive their divine nature from the Father, can be said to participate in His Being.
To use a rather outlandish example, imagine that the entire human race has been wiped out in some freak nuclear accident apart from one survivor - a genius scientist named Tom. Tom has two best friends called Dick and Harry and although he couldn't completely save them, being a scientific genius he did manage to preserve each of their brains which he now keeps in two jars of formaldehyde. Again, being a scientific genius, Tom has managed to wire each of his two friends' brains up to his own body so that each of them is now able to see through Tom's eyes, to speak through his mouth and even to walk around, pick things up etc, using Tom's feet, hands and limbs. Fortunately, Tom Dick and Harry have similar tastes in terms of where they want to go and what they want to do, so there are no conflicts over how to make use of Tom's body. In this bizarre scenario, I think it would be appropriate to say that there are three human persons - Tom, Dick and Harry - but only one human being, namely Tom, although the other two persons participate in Tom's being through having access to his human physical attributes. In other words they derive the non-personal aspects of their human nature from Tom. Likewise, in the case of the Holy Trinity we can say that there are three God-Persons and one God-Being, the Father, from whom the other two God-Persons derive their divine nature and attributes.
The scripture passages which speak of the Father as the one true God do so because he is the only true God-Being. However, all three God-Persons, in equal measure, possess and partake of the nature and attributes of that Being just as, in my analogy, the three human persons, Tom, Dick and Harry, share in the one human nature which is derived from the one surviving human being, Tom.
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