I've already spotted the flaw in the 'three clones' analogy from my post earlier today.
Imagine one of the clones (Dick, say) is bitten by a dog. Now, since Dick was bitten and neither Tom nor Harry were, and since each of the clones is the same one man, then we would have to say that the same one man was both bitten by a dog and not bitten by a dog. This is clearly impossible, since a thing can't be both 'x' and 'not x' simultaneously. Therefore, as with my many previous attempts, my latest analogy of the Trinity, when subjected to a detailed analysis, has proven itself to be logically incoherent.
Thursday, 23 March 2017
The only way to make sense of the doctrine of the Trinity?
I regularly come across articles and posts on the internet which claim to offer coherent explanations of the doctrine of the Trinity yet, however promising they may seem at first glance, on close examination they almost always prove to have one or more fatal flaws. The majority of attempted explanations of the doctrine of the Trinity fall down in one of three ways. They either end up with no real distinction between the persons (the husband / brother / son analogy), or with distinctions that cannot exist simultaneously (eg. water / ice / steam) or – most commonly of all – with the Persons of the Trinity as parts of God rather than each of them actually being God as the doctrine requires. Many allegedly coherent explanations of the Trinity involve the idea of God as one entity with three ‘minds’ or ‘centres of consiousness’. The trouble with such models is that the only elements in them of which there are three instances (and therefore the only elements which are capable of representing the Persons) are the ‘minds’ themselves, so that on close analysis it becomes plain that the Persons are not actually depicted as God but simply as minds or centres of consciousness of God. And if each of the Persons is not merely a mind of God, but is the actual Being of God Himself, then, since there is only one Being of God, it follows that each of them is the exact same thing - in which case we end up with no distinction between the Persons.
Another of the most common ways in which the coherence of the doctrine of the Trinity is supposedly defended is to say that there is no contradiction between God’s oneness and His threeness, since the oneness applies to what God is and the threeness to who He is. God is, in other words, ‘three whos and one what’. But the trouble is, if each of the ‘whos’ is the ‘what’ (because each of the Persons is God) and there is only one ‘what’ then, once again, each of the ‘whos’ must be the exact same thing, of which there is only one. So, again, we end up with no distinction between the Persons.
I believe that grammar is the logical component of language – a universal element of all human languages, because logic itself is universal truth in the same way that mathematics is. The doctrine of the Trinity – at least in its traditional, orthodox form - is, it would seem, almost impossible to explain coherently in a way that does not defy the limits of grammar - and therefore the very bounds of logic and rational coherence.
There are, however, two ways in which I have found that it is possible to describe the Trinity without abandoning the normal rules of grammar. One is to view the word God as referring to a ‘mass noun’ rather than (or as well as) a ‘count noun’. Then we could say that while the Father is a Being called God, the Son and the Spirit are each God in the sense that they consist of a substance called ‘God’, even though neither of them is a God or the God (similarly to how a piece of an apple is still called 'apple' but not an apple or the apple - or how a piece of cake is called 'cake' but not a cake or the cake). However, I rejected this approach for the simple reason that this is not the way in which the vast majority of Christians (or others in the Abrahamic tradition) understand the meaning of the word ‘God’. He is not a substance in the material sense, or even analogous to a material substance.
The second way in which it is possible to make grammatical sense of the doctrine of the Trinity is by viewing the Persons in the same way we might view clones. For example, if a man called Tom made two clones of himself, called Dick and Harry, we could perhaps say that Tom, Dick and Harry, while being three distinct persons (because they are three distinct subjects (in the sense that only Tom can [truthfully] say “I am Tom”, only Dick can say “I am Dick” and only Harry can say “I am Harry”) are all actually the same man (three different versions of that one man, if you like). In the past, I have rejected this idea because, while it is possible to say that Tom, Dick and Harry are all the same man, it also seems perfectly reasonable to describe them as three identical men. Nevertheless, more than perhaps any other type of Trinitarian model or attempted explanation, this 'clone' analogy does, I think, provide a way to speak of God in trinitarian terms while not departing from grammatical (or logical) coherence. The Father is the one true God, and the Son and the Spirit are two other versions of that same God. One version of God became a man, the other two versions did not – God was crucified in one of His versions, but not in the other two, etc. Of course, the Son and the Spirit are not literally clones of the Father in the genetic sense - this is only an analogy, after all - and, unlike Dick and Harry, they had no beginning in time.
In my first post on this blog I quoted Sir Arthur Conan Doyle: "Once you eliminate the impossible, whatever remains, no matter how improbable, must be the truth." I have no intention of leaving the Christian faith (as the disciples said to Jesus in John 6:68 when he asked if they were going to leave him: “"Lord, to whom shall we go? You have the words of eternal life”) and, whether I like it or not, the Trinity is one of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity – about as near to a non-negotiable as it’s possible to get. So it’s important to me to have a way of understanding the doctrine that makes sense to me. This analogy of the clones, then, being the only way I can make sense of the teachings espoused in the Nicene and Athanasian creeds, is the model that I choose to adopt as my own understanding of the true meaning of the doctrine of the Trinity and as the closest we can come, in my opinion, to a true appreciation of the trinitarian nature of the Godhead.
Another of the most common ways in which the coherence of the doctrine of the Trinity is supposedly defended is to say that there is no contradiction between God’s oneness and His threeness, since the oneness applies to what God is and the threeness to who He is. God is, in other words, ‘three whos and one what’. But the trouble is, if each of the ‘whos’ is the ‘what’ (because each of the Persons is God) and there is only one ‘what’ then, once again, each of the ‘whos’ must be the exact same thing, of which there is only one. So, again, we end up with no distinction between the Persons.
I believe that grammar is the logical component of language – a universal element of all human languages, because logic itself is universal truth in the same way that mathematics is. The doctrine of the Trinity – at least in its traditional, orthodox form - is, it would seem, almost impossible to explain coherently in a way that does not defy the limits of grammar - and therefore the very bounds of logic and rational coherence.
There are, however, two ways in which I have found that it is possible to describe the Trinity without abandoning the normal rules of grammar. One is to view the word God as referring to a ‘mass noun’ rather than (or as well as) a ‘count noun’. Then we could say that while the Father is a Being called God, the Son and the Spirit are each God in the sense that they consist of a substance called ‘God’, even though neither of them is a God or the God (similarly to how a piece of an apple is still called 'apple' but not an apple or the apple - or how a piece of cake is called 'cake' but not a cake or the cake). However, I rejected this approach for the simple reason that this is not the way in which the vast majority of Christians (or others in the Abrahamic tradition) understand the meaning of the word ‘God’. He is not a substance in the material sense, or even analogous to a material substance.
The second way in which it is possible to make grammatical sense of the doctrine of the Trinity is by viewing the Persons in the same way we might view clones. For example, if a man called Tom made two clones of himself, called Dick and Harry, we could perhaps say that Tom, Dick and Harry, while being three distinct persons (because they are three distinct subjects (in the sense that only Tom can [truthfully] say “I am Tom”, only Dick can say “I am Dick” and only Harry can say “I am Harry”) are all actually the same man (three different versions of that one man, if you like). In the past, I have rejected this idea because, while it is possible to say that Tom, Dick and Harry are all the same man, it also seems perfectly reasonable to describe them as three identical men. Nevertheless, more than perhaps any other type of Trinitarian model or attempted explanation, this 'clone' analogy does, I think, provide a way to speak of God in trinitarian terms while not departing from grammatical (or logical) coherence. The Father is the one true God, and the Son and the Spirit are two other versions of that same God. One version of God became a man, the other two versions did not – God was crucified in one of His versions, but not in the other two, etc. Of course, the Son and the Spirit are not literally clones of the Father in the genetic sense - this is only an analogy, after all - and, unlike Dick and Harry, they had no beginning in time.
In my first post on this blog I quoted Sir Arthur Conan Doyle: "Once you eliminate the impossible, whatever remains, no matter how improbable, must be the truth." I have no intention of leaving the Christian faith (as the disciples said to Jesus in John 6:68 when he asked if they were going to leave him: “"Lord, to whom shall we go? You have the words of eternal life”) and, whether I like it or not, the Trinity is one of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity – about as near to a non-negotiable as it’s possible to get. So it’s important to me to have a way of understanding the doctrine that makes sense to me. This analogy of the clones, then, being the only way I can make sense of the teachings espoused in the Nicene and Athanasian creeds, is the model that I choose to adopt as my own understanding of the true meaning of the doctrine of the Trinity and as the closest we can come, in my opinion, to a true appreciation of the trinitarian nature of the Godhead.
Wednesday, 11 January 2017
One Person in three guises
I have mentioned in a previous post that the Latin word 'persona' (from which we derive the English word 'person') is itself derived from a Greek word which originally meant 'mask' (as in the mask worn by an actor on the stage. In this post, I propose the word 'guise' (not to be confused with disguise) as an appropriate substitute for the word that is usually rendered 'Person' when referring to the trinitarian nature of God. The traditional formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity involves the concept of God as three Persons in one Being. I am suggesting, instead, the idea of God as one Person (in the modern sense of the word, ie. an individual conscious entity, a self) in three guises.
The "only true God" (John 17:3) is the Father, but we encounter him in two other guises: firstly, He is fully present in the life and teachings of Jesus and, secondly, He is fully present in the form of (or, rather, by means of) His Spirit (the same Spirit which was, and is, present in Jesus). When we encounter God in the life and teachings of Jesus, rather than call Him the Father, we refer to Him as the Word (see John 1) or, since Jesus' relationship with God was so utterly intimate that He was able to say "I and the Father are One", and Jesus is, in a unique way, God's Son, we can also refer to God in this guise as the Son - but that is not to imply that Jesus the man is actually God himself, or that Jesus and the Father are the same Person, only that God is fully present in Jesus and in his life and ministry (see 2 Corinthians 5:19).
When we encounter God in the guise of the Spirit then we refer to Him as such, ie. as the Spirit, rather than as the Father.
I think this understanding of God can be distinguished from modalism/sabellianism, because in the modalist idea of God, the Father and the Son (Jesus) are considered to be the same Person and this, perhaps, is the reason for modalism being declared a heresy, since it would mean that when Jesus prays to the Father it is actually God praying to Himself. The model that I am proposing does not, however, suffer from this problem.
Actually, all of this is really just another way of stating the position I set out with my very first post on this blog, the idea of one God in three presences.
The "only true God" (John 17:3) is the Father, but we encounter him in two other guises: firstly, He is fully present in the life and teachings of Jesus and, secondly, He is fully present in the form of (or, rather, by means of) His Spirit (the same Spirit which was, and is, present in Jesus). When we encounter God in the life and teachings of Jesus, rather than call Him the Father, we refer to Him as the Word (see John 1) or, since Jesus' relationship with God was so utterly intimate that He was able to say "I and the Father are One", and Jesus is, in a unique way, God's Son, we can also refer to God in this guise as the Son - but that is not to imply that Jesus the man is actually God himself, or that Jesus and the Father are the same Person, only that God is fully present in Jesus and in his life and ministry (see 2 Corinthians 5:19).
When we encounter God in the guise of the Spirit then we refer to Him as such, ie. as the Spirit, rather than as the Father.
I think this understanding of God can be distinguished from modalism/sabellianism, because in the modalist idea of God, the Father and the Son (Jesus) are considered to be the same Person and this, perhaps, is the reason for modalism being declared a heresy, since it would mean that when Jesus prays to the Father it is actually God praying to Himself. The model that I am proposing does not, however, suffer from this problem.
Actually, all of this is really just another way of stating the position I set out with my very first post on this blog, the idea of one God in three presences.
Saturday, 10 September 2016
More 'Symbolic Trinitarianism'
Imagine that, in a General Election, each of the three main UK parties gets exactly one third of the vote. As a result it is agreed that the three party leaders (Theresa May, Jeremy Corbyn and Tim Farron) will share the role of Prime Minister. Not only that, but, by some miracle, it turns out that all three of them agree 100% on every single issue imaginable so that every action or decision of one of the three is fully concurred with by the other two. Furthermore, due to the wonders of modern technology they are constantly linked to each other by an online connection which means that any conversation one of them takes part in is instantaneously seen and heard - and, naturally, concurred with - by the other two.
In the situation described above, would it be legitimate to say that although each of the three party leaders is Prime Minister, there is actually only one Prime Minister because each of the three share exactly the same power and knowledge and - because of their absolute agreement on all possible issues - there is no possibility of conflict, rivalry or disagreement between them?
I think that this type of model is one way to make some kind of sense out of the doctrine of the Trinity. Each of the Divine Persons shares the one office of God (ie. the office of supreme ruler of the universe). Since each of the Persons fully possesses all the divine powers and attributes (ie. each is fully omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient, omnibenevolent etc.) and since, because of the infinite nature of the divine attributes, each individual Person has these attributes to the exact same degree as do the three of them combined, and since there is no possibility of disagreement or rivalry between them, perhaps it is legitimate to symbolise this situation by referring to each of the Persons as God while simultaneously asserting that there is only one God.
A similar model is to think of God as a Composite Being comprised of three inseparable Divine Persons and to assert that each of the Persons is fully God even though none of them is all of God. Again, this is to symbolise the fact that each each of the Persons fully possesses all the divine powers and attributes (ie. each is fully omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient, omnibenevolent etc.) and that, because of the infinite nature of the divine attributes, each individual Person has these attributes to the exact same degree as do the three of them combined, and also that there is no possibility of disagreement or rivalry between the Persons.
Personally, I incline more towards the first of these models because of my (biblically based) belief that the Father is "the only true God" while the Son and Spirit share fully in His divine power and attributes.
Of course, neither of these models can explain how God could literally be both one Being and three Persons simultaneously. For example, using the first model, imagine one of the Prime Ministerial Persons has an egg thown at him/her. In that case, it would be possible to say that the Prime Minister both did and did not get splatted with egg yolk (depending on which of the Persons one is considering). Yet it is logically impossible for the same thing to be both 'X' and 'not X' simultaneously.
In the situation described above, would it be legitimate to say that although each of the three party leaders is Prime Minister, there is actually only one Prime Minister because each of the three share exactly the same power and knowledge and - because of their absolute agreement on all possible issues - there is no possibility of conflict, rivalry or disagreement between them?
I think that this type of model is one way to make some kind of sense out of the doctrine of the Trinity. Each of the Divine Persons shares the one office of God (ie. the office of supreme ruler of the universe). Since each of the Persons fully possesses all the divine powers and attributes (ie. each is fully omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient, omnibenevolent etc.) and since, because of the infinite nature of the divine attributes, each individual Person has these attributes to the exact same degree as do the three of them combined, and since there is no possibility of disagreement or rivalry between them, perhaps it is legitimate to symbolise this situation by referring to each of the Persons as God while simultaneously asserting that there is only one God.
A similar model is to think of God as a Composite Being comprised of three inseparable Divine Persons and to assert that each of the Persons is fully God even though none of them is all of God. Again, this is to symbolise the fact that each each of the Persons fully possesses all the divine powers and attributes (ie. each is fully omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient, omnibenevolent etc.) and that, because of the infinite nature of the divine attributes, each individual Person has these attributes to the exact same degree as do the three of them combined, and also that there is no possibility of disagreement or rivalry between the Persons.
Personally, I incline more towards the first of these models because of my (biblically based) belief that the Father is "the only true God" while the Son and Spirit share fully in His divine power and attributes.
Of course, neither of these models can explain how God could literally be both one Being and three Persons simultaneously. For example, using the first model, imagine one of the Prime Ministerial Persons has an egg thown at him/her. In that case, it would be possible to say that the Prime Minister both did and did not get splatted with egg yolk (depending on which of the Persons one is considering). Yet it is logically impossible for the same thing to be both 'X' and 'not X' simultaneously.
Friday, 9 September 2016
Group names and collective entities
Most of the top premier league football clubs have massive squads of players as well as many non-playing staff. But when 11 members of, say, Manchester United, travel to another team's ground for an away match, we say that Manchester United (not 'some of Manchester United' or 'part of Manchester United') have come to play.
Similarly, imagine a pop group (let's invent one - we'll call them 'The Bloggers') has five members. If one of the members gets sick and the remaining four do a gig, we still say that the Bloggers (not some of the Bloggers or part of the Bloggers) are performing.
If Mr and Mrs Smith and two of their four children turn up at my house I will probably inform my wife that "the Smith family have arrived", rather than denoting them as 'some of the Smith family' or 'part of the Smith family'.
In these cases, a part of the collective entity (team/group/family)possesses all the essence of the whole and (in the case of the football team or pop group) is authorised by the whole to use the official name of the whole.
How far these examples are useful to understanding the Doctrine of the Trinity (by demonstrating that a part of an entity can be legitimately designated by the same term used to denote the entity in its entirety) is debatable, however. I'm not sure we would ever call one footballer by the name of his team or one pop group member by the name of the group. And if Mr Smith popped over for lunch I wouldn't describe my guest as 'the Smith family'. It seems that what these examples consist of is group names, and that such names can be equally applied to the whole of the group or to a part of the group but never to a 'non-group', ie. they cannot be applied to an individual (such as a Person).
Similarly, imagine a pop group (let's invent one - we'll call them 'The Bloggers') has five members. If one of the members gets sick and the remaining four do a gig, we still say that the Bloggers (not some of the Bloggers or part of the Bloggers) are performing.
If Mr and Mrs Smith and two of their four children turn up at my house I will probably inform my wife that "the Smith family have arrived", rather than denoting them as 'some of the Smith family' or 'part of the Smith family'.
In these cases, a part of the collective entity (team/group/family)possesses all the essence of the whole and (in the case of the football team or pop group) is authorised by the whole to use the official name of the whole.
How far these examples are useful to understanding the Doctrine of the Trinity (by demonstrating that a part of an entity can be legitimately designated by the same term used to denote the entity in its entirety) is debatable, however. I'm not sure we would ever call one footballer by the name of his team or one pop group member by the name of the group. And if Mr Smith popped over for lunch I wouldn't describe my guest as 'the Smith family'. It seems that what these examples consist of is group names, and that such names can be equally applied to the whole of the group or to a part of the group but never to a 'non-group', ie. they cannot be applied to an individual (such as a Person).
Wednesday, 24 August 2016
Is God a set of attributes?
If we were to conveive of the word 'God' as referring to a set of conditions, qualities or attributes, there would cease to be a problem with understanding the doctrine of the trinity. I have thought of several analogies that could work on this basis. For example, there can be many instances of the English alphabet (in a school textbook, a poster on a classroom wall, a children's song etc). Each of them is a true instance of the English alphabet yet there is only one English alphabet.
There could be several versions of the National Anthem, yet there would still be only one National Anthem.
The play I am watching at the theatre in London is 'Hamlet'. The play you are watching in New York is also 'Hamlet'. Yet there is only one play called 'Hamlet'.
What these things have in common is that they are sets of symbols, sounds or words that can be arranged or reproduced in various ways so that each arrangement is a distinct version of the one set.
On this basis, one could resolve the problem of the apparent incoherence of the doctrine of the Trinity by conceiving of God as a set of divine qualities (say, omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence and omnibenevolence) and then positing each of the three Persons as a distinct, personalised instance (or personification) of that set of qualities, each one comprising a different 'arrangement' of the entire set.
I do not believe, however, that this would be a viable approach, since Christians have always conveived of the one God as a concrete Being, not an abstract set of qualities or attributes. A set of qualities cannot be personal (or 'superpersonal') even if 'personality' or 'personalness' is one of the qualities in the set. I know of no instance in the English language where a set of qualities or attributes could be described as 'him' or 'her', no matter how many people it is personified by.
There could be several versions of the National Anthem, yet there would still be only one National Anthem.
The play I am watching at the theatre in London is 'Hamlet'. The play you are watching in New York is also 'Hamlet'. Yet there is only one play called 'Hamlet'.
What these things have in common is that they are sets of symbols, sounds or words that can be arranged or reproduced in various ways so that each arrangement is a distinct version of the one set.
On this basis, one could resolve the problem of the apparent incoherence of the doctrine of the Trinity by conceiving of God as a set of divine qualities (say, omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence and omnibenevolence) and then positing each of the three Persons as a distinct, personalised instance (or personification) of that set of qualities, each one comprising a different 'arrangement' of the entire set.
I do not believe, however, that this would be a viable approach, since Christians have always conveived of the one God as a concrete Being, not an abstract set of qualities or attributes. A set of qualities cannot be personal (or 'superpersonal') even if 'personality' or 'personalness' is one of the qualities in the set. I know of no instance in the English language where a set of qualities or attributes could be described as 'him' or 'her', no matter how many people it is personified by.
Tuesday, 23 August 2016
Embracing paradox
Recently, I was reading about the existentialist philospher Kierkegaard's view that ultimate truth is impossible for human beings to grasp because we do not have the necessary conceptual framework. This is not the same as when people say that 'God is beyond logic'. Rather, it is to say that the truth about God is perfectly logical within the context of the infinite and eternal realm that God inhabits but that, being finite creatures bound by space and time, what we are able to grasp of the truth about God appears to us to be paradoxical.
Imagine living in a two dimensional world like that described by C.S. Lewis in the passage from Mere Christianity that I quoted in my second post on this blog. Now imagine looking at two squares, the first measuring 2" x 2", the second measuring 6" x 6". The idea that the first of these shapes could be larger than the second would seem totally illogical and against all the rules of mathematics. This is because, as someone only capable of thinking in two dimensions, I am aware of the size in terms of area, but not in terms of volume, which would be totally beyond my experience or even ability to conceptualise. In actual fact it is perfectly possible for the first shape to be larger than the second if, for example, as well as its length and width of 2" x 2", it had a height of, say, 10" while the second shape had a height of only 1". In that case, the volume of the first shape (which is in actuality a cube rather than a square) would be 40" (2" x 2" x 10") while that of the second shape would be only 36" (6" x 6" x 1").
Ultimately, however, I do not think Kierkegaard's idea that eternal truth appears to finite minds as paradox can be used as a way of justifying belief in the doctrine of the Trinity. It doesn't make any difference how much we fail to understand about the nature of the Father or of the Son (or simply of the Being called God) or how impossible it is to grasp who or what they are in themselves as opposed to how they appear to our limited finite minds. The relevant issue is the idea that neither the Father nor the Son is the other, yet each of them is the same Being, namely God. The assertion that a=/=b yet a=x and b=x is just as illogical, no matter what a,b and x represent. Of course, if the word 'is' had some special meaning in the infinite or eternal dimension which was incapable of being grasped by our finite minds then it would be possible to say that the doctrine of the Trinity is true in some sense that it is beyond our capacity as finite beings to grasp. But the word 'is' was invented by us finite, time/space-bound creatures to serve a particular linguistic role, to convey the idea of identity as understood by us finite, time/space-bound creatures. It's meaning is defined by us and us alone. Defenders of the doctrine of the Trinity cannot, therefore, appeal to the infinite, eternal realm as an escape route from the incoherence and internally contradictory nature of that doctrine.
Imagine living in a two dimensional world like that described by C.S. Lewis in the passage from Mere Christianity that I quoted in my second post on this blog. Now imagine looking at two squares, the first measuring 2" x 2", the second measuring 6" x 6". The idea that the first of these shapes could be larger than the second would seem totally illogical and against all the rules of mathematics. This is because, as someone only capable of thinking in two dimensions, I am aware of the size in terms of area, but not in terms of volume, which would be totally beyond my experience or even ability to conceptualise. In actual fact it is perfectly possible for the first shape to be larger than the second if, for example, as well as its length and width of 2" x 2", it had a height of, say, 10" while the second shape had a height of only 1". In that case, the volume of the first shape (which is in actuality a cube rather than a square) would be 40" (2" x 2" x 10") while that of the second shape would be only 36" (6" x 6" x 1").
Ultimately, however, I do not think Kierkegaard's idea that eternal truth appears to finite minds as paradox can be used as a way of justifying belief in the doctrine of the Trinity. It doesn't make any difference how much we fail to understand about the nature of the Father or of the Son (or simply of the Being called God) or how impossible it is to grasp who or what they are in themselves as opposed to how they appear to our limited finite minds. The relevant issue is the idea that neither the Father nor the Son is the other, yet each of them is the same Being, namely God. The assertion that a=/=b yet a=x and b=x is just as illogical, no matter what a,b and x represent. Of course, if the word 'is' had some special meaning in the infinite or eternal dimension which was incapable of being grasped by our finite minds then it would be possible to say that the doctrine of the Trinity is true in some sense that it is beyond our capacity as finite beings to grasp. But the word 'is' was invented by us finite, time/space-bound creatures to serve a particular linguistic role, to convey the idea of identity as understood by us finite, time/space-bound creatures. It's meaning is defined by us and us alone. Defenders of the doctrine of the Trinity cannot, therefore, appeal to the infinite, eternal realm as an escape route from the incoherence and internally contradictory nature of that doctrine.
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